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The Archer Daniels Midland litigation and its aftermath highlighted the
oddity of the continued use of the refunding clause in bond covenants, despite
its legal ineffectiveness. This Note suggests three reasons for why the refunding
clause might have retained value despite judicial curtailment of its legal reach:
investor ignorance of the legal details of bond indentures, discounted but
residual legal value, and extra-judicial reputation-based enforcement. The
reputation-based hypothesis construes the refunding clause as a division of
benefits between issuers and investors, where issuers retain the right to call
-bonds for "legitimate" business purposes, but investors are promised all gains
from market interest rate movements. In this view, the refunding clause is an
implicit pledge by issuers not to appropriate bondholders' market gains. As this
line is too fine for courts to police, the understood pact is enforced via investor
retaliation against future bond issues and other reputation effects. Initial
empirical observations yield mixed results: There is support for the
preconditions of the reputation-based hypothesis as to investors, but
observations of bond issuances are less supportive, suggesting that the use of
the refunding clause, while still done by some companies, decreased sharply
following the Archer Daniels Midland decision. These observations also
suggest, however, that many other factors were at work and that this drop in
use might be the result of changes aside from the clause's legal value.
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Introduction
In 1983, a decision by Archer Daniels Midland (ADM) to call' some of its
outstanding bonds took bond investors by surprise.2 Part of this shock stemmed
from the belief that ADM's action was forbidden by a "refunding clause" in the
bond's indenture. Based on this belief, a sophisticated investor even took ADM
to court over the issue. Holding that ADM's action was not forbidden by the
refunding clause, the court ruled in ADM's favor. Indeed, despite the shock of
investors, ADM's call and its subsequent legal victory should not have been a
surprise to anyone. Precedent strongly favored ADM's position, since the
limitations on the refunding clause's legal power were already exposed in
litigation that was resolved years before the ADM bonds in question were even
issued. But even after the high-profile ADM case, some companies still
employed refunding clauses in new issuances. 3 The ADM episode and its
aftermath present a legal puzzle: How can we explain the continued existence
of a contract term that appears to have no legal value?
One possible answer is that investors were simply unaware of the state of
the law surrounding refunding clauses. Another possibility is that while adverse
precedents reduce the probability of a successful lawsuit, such precedents do
not reduce the chances of prevailing in court to zero. This Note suggests a
different possibility: The refunding clause has endured because some part of
the clause's value is derived from extra-judicial sources. In other words, apart
from any legal value that the clause might or might not have, the market could
nevertheless value the clause for other reasons.
While a number of authors have suggested the forces of reputation or
other informal devices, 4 this Note goes further in suggesting that the refunding
clause allows for a specific deal that finely divides the benefits of refunding
I With regard to bonds, a call is the right of the issuer to repurchase the bond, usually at a
fixed price. See JOHN DOWNES & JORDAN ELLIOT GOODMAN, DICTIONARY OF FINANCE AND
INVESTMENT TERMS 75-77 (5th ed. 1998) (defining "call" and related terms). By exercising its call
option, ADM was attempting to repurchase its debt at a fixed price, regardless of the trading price of
ADM's bonds in the bond market.
2 The details of this episode and the ensuing litigation are related more fully infra Part I.
3 There are some instances where companies continued to use refunding clauses. See infra text
accompanying notes 33-35. However, for reasons that are unclear and potentially separate from the
ADM litigation and court holding, the continued use of refunding clauses does not appear to have been a
widespread phenomenon. See infra Section III.B.
4 See infra notes 86, 104, 106-108 and accompanying text.
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between investors and issuers in a "good faith" manner.5 The clause seems to
serve as a signal of an implicit agreement between investors and the issuer that
the investors should receive the benefits of market changes in interest rates,
while the issuer retains the "legitimate" business benefits that can flow from
calling debt. This implicit agreement binds the issuer because it is self-
enforcing through investor retaliation and reputation effects. This parsing of
outcomes seems to be one that both investors and issuers desire, yet cannot
replicate through formal enforcement of legally airtight contracts. Hence, the
utility of refunding clauses may be greater than simply the low probability of
successful legal enforcement; refunding clauses may have the additional benefit
of producing a nuanced, precise division of benefits.
Part I relates the details of the ADM episode, as well as discussing the
curious persistence of refunding clauses. Part II seeks to explain this
phenomenon. It examines three possible reasons that refunding clauses may
retain some value, including the reputation explanation. Part III provides
directions for future research by presenting some initial empirical observations.
Part IV concludes.
I. The Puzzling ADM Episode
On the evening of June 1, 1983, news of Archer Daniels Midland's
decision to call its 16% sinking fund debentures, due May 15, 2011, in August
1983 broke upon the corporate bond market.6 The resulting drop in bond prices
led the investment bank Morgan Stanley to sue ADM in hopes of preventing
the call from taking place.7 In the month preceding the call announcement,
Morgan Stanley had taken a position of approximately $16 million, in face
value, in the ADM bonds.8 If Morgan Stanley were to hold the bonds to the call
date, the firm would have lost approximately $1.8 million.9
The reaction of the bond market and of Morgan Stanley was rooted in the
refunding clause found in the indenture for the ADM bonds, which seemed to
prohibit any calls prior to May 15, 1991 that were
from the proceeds, or in anticipation, of the issuance of any indebtedness for
money borrowed by or for the account of the Company or any Subsidiary or
from the proceeds, or in anticipation, of a sale and leaseback transaction.., if,
5 The term "good faith" is not used here for the legal contractual notion of good faith, but
rather as an extra-legal, implicitly understood, business concept. For an argument that legal notions of
good faith should be employed in judicial decisions on debt contracts, by placing higher burdens on
debtors to favor dispersed bondholders, see Victor Brudney, Corporate Bondholders and Debtor
Opportunism: In Bad Times and Good, 105 HARV. L. REv. 1821, 1869-75, 1877-78 (1992).
6 RIcHARD S. WILSON & FRANK J. FABozzi, THE NEW CORPORATE BOND MARKET 186
(1990).
7 Morgan Stanley & Co. v. Archer Daniels Midland Co., 570 F. Supp. 1529, 1530 (S.D.N.Y.
1983).
8 Id. at 1532.
9 WILSON & FABozzi, supra note 6, at 187.
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in either case, the interest cost or interest factor applicable thereto ... shall be10
less than 16.08% per annum.
Between the issuance of these 16% debentures and the ensuing call, ADM
had, in the court's view, raised money through borrowing at less than 16.08%
at least twice, while also raising money through two common stock offerings
during the same period of time.11 Morgan Stanley's claim, as characterized by
the court, was that these borrowings were "proof that the redemption is being
funded, at least indirectly, from the proceeds of borrowing in violation of the
Debentures and Indenture agreement." 12 The court nevertheless found against
Morgan Stanley, denying both the bank's request for a preliminary injunction
prohibiting the call and its claim for contractual damages after the bonds were
retired. 13
ADM, however, had not completely bested investors. As Wilson and
Fabozzi put it, "[i]nvestors don't readily forget the times that they lost money,
especially if they felt that they might have been 'bamboozled."" ' 4 When ADM
tried to sell a new set of 13% bonds on August 6, 1984, again with the same ten
year refunding clause, underwriters managed to sell only 70% of the issue at
the original offering terms, and the bonds dropped immediately in value as
trading began. 15 Furthermore, ADM's next bond issue in January 1986 was
simply non-callable for life, and the company chose to retire its 13%
debentures in April 1986 through a tender offer, rather than exercising its call
again. 16
One of the most puzzling issues arising from ADM is why it was so
shocking to the bond market, or why commentators would later dub this
decision "an important event in [the] modem corporate bond world, as it
substantially eroded the effectiveness of standard refunding provisions."' 7 The
court's decision in ADM was not driven by novel legal theories, but rather
deduced from long-standing, widely available sources. In making its initial
determination on Morgan Stanley's preliminary injunction request, the court
looked to the commentary accompanying the model bond indenture "from
which the boilerplate language in question was apparently taken verbatim."'1 8 A
relatively straightforward analysis of the commentary led the court to "read this
10 Archer Daniels Midland, 570 F. Supp. at 1531 ni. It is not clear whether the entirety of
this bond indenture is still in existence. The author attempted to locate it, contacting an Assistant
Treasurer at ADM, to see if the document was still on file with the company. The response was that
documentation for these bonds had almost certainly been destroyed, because the issue had been called
and there were no longer any tax or audit purposes for retaining the documentation.
II Id. at 1531-32.
12 Id. at 1532.
13 Id. at 1538, 1542.




18 Archer Daniels Midland, 570 F. Supp. at 1535.
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comment as pointing to the source of funds as the dispositive factor in
determining the availability of redemption to the issuer-the position advanced
by defendant ADM."'19
Besides relying on interpretative advice provided with the exact contract
language, the court also looked to previous decisions. Indeed, the eventual
decision on the contract claims in ADM was largely guided by an existing
precedent that was almost perfectly on point.20 In Franklin Life Insurance Co.
v. Commonwealth Edison Co., an investor challenged Commonwealth Edison's
redemption, using proceeds from a common stock offering, of its 9.44%
preferred stock-a redemption done two years after the preferred stock was
issued, even though the preferred stock had a refunding clause prohibiting
lower cost refunding for ten years. 2 1 The court in Franklin ruled for the issuer,
because the refunding clause "requires an examination of only the source of the
funds actually used to achieve the redemption." 22 This rule rejected the
Franklin plaintiffs' contention that the issuer was redeeming in "anticipation"
of lower cost borrowing; the plaintiffs had argued for a broad reading of the
refunding prohibition, so that Edison's plan (at the time of redemption) to
borrow additional lower interest debt would have been sufficient to bar the
call.23 By deciding against the plaintiffs, the Franklin court had determined that
the refunding clause did not "require[] an examination of the entire borrowing
activities of' the issuer.24 Franklin was handled down in 1978, three years
before the ADM bonds contested by Morgan Stanley were even issued. This
fact did not go unnoticed by the court deciding ADM, and was used to bolster
the court's reliance on Franklin:
Moreover, we note that the decision in Franklin preceded the drafting of the
ADM Indenture by several years. We must assume, therefore, that the decision
was readily available to bond counsel for all parties .... While Franklin was
decided under Illinois law and is therefore not binding on the New York courts,
we cannot ignore the fact that it was the single existing authority on this issue,
and was decided on the basis of universal contract principles. Under these
circumstances, it was predictable that Franklin would affect any subsequent
decision under New York law. Franklin thus adds an unavoidable gloss to any
interpretation of the redemption language.
25
But the disputes and fallout from the episode of the ADM 16% debentures
suggests that the Franklin "source rule" did not change expectations of the
protection yielded by refunding provisions. Nor was Franklin the only pre-
19 Id.
20 Id. at 1539-42, 1539 ("[T]he [Franklin] district court found, with respect to language nearly
identical to that now before us, that an early redemption of preferred stock was lawful where funded
directly from the proceeds of a common stock offering.").
21 Franklin Life Ins. Co. v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 451 F. Supp. 602, 605-06, 612-13
(S.D. Il1. 1978), aff'dper curiam, 598 F.2d 1109 (7th Cir. 1979).
22 Id. at 614.
23 Id. at 613-14.
24 Id. at 614.
25 Archer Daniels Midland, 570 F. Supp. at 1541-42.
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ADM decision where issuers had successfully redeemed bonds in spite of
refunding clauses. 26 This lack of market reaction after adverse legal decisions is
especially striking because bondholder protections are almost entirely
contractual, and boilerplate contract language is construed uniformly as a
question of law.
27
The ADM episode reaffirmed a major legal problem with the source rule.
The source rule seems to allow, because of the "fungibility of money,"
circumvention of refunding provisions through cautious separation of funds.
28
While the source rule would not allow the most egregious abuses to go
unpunished,29 legal commentary has nevertheless viewed the rule as largely
ineffective in providing protection. As one commentator wrote, Franklin and
ADM make "[c]lear... that the prohibition against lower rate refinancing ...
must be clearly set forth with all inclusive language to prevent the corporation
from finding a loophole in which to reap a large reward during low interest rate
26 Associated Builders, Inc. v. Ala. Power Co., 505 F.2d 97 (5th Cir. 1974) (upholding use of
a sinking fund to redeem bonds at par before the refunding prohibition had passed); Harris v. Union
Elec. Co., 622 S.W.2d 239 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981) (upholding validity of issuer's aborted plan to refund
bonds before the expiration of a refunding prohibition, by redeeming them at par through the operation
of improvement and maintenance funds). An analogous case was also decided in Florida around the
same time as ADM. Lucas v. Fla. Power & Light Co., 575 F. Supp. 552 (S.D. Fla. 1983) (upholding
issuer's 1977 bond redemption through a replacement fund, before the refunding prohibition had
expired, and refusing to find a Rule lOb-5 violation for failing to disclose the possibility of such a
redemption), affd, 765 F.2d 1039 (1 1th Cir. 1985). See discussion of all three of these cases infra text
accompanying notes 110-111, 113-128.
27 Sharon Steel Corp. v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 691 F.2d 1039, 1048-49 (2d Cir.
1982). The strictly contractual nature of bonds is true as a matter of state law as well. As Chancellor
Allen of Delaware explained:
Under our law-and the law generally-the relationship between a corporation and the
holders of its debt securities, even convertible debt securities, is contractual in nature.... The
rights and obligations of the various parties are or should be spelled out in that documentation.
The terms of the contractual relationship agreed to and not broad concepts such as fairness
define the corporation's obligation to its bondholders.
Katz v. Oak Indus., Inc., 508 A.2d 873, 879 (Del. Ch. 1986). The Chancellor did, however, allow that
contract notions of good faith and fair dealing applied, although distinguishing them from fiduciary
duties. Id. at 879 n.7.
28 Chester L. Fisher III & James Greenfield, Refunding Provisions and the Archer Daniels
Midland Case, 39 Bus. LAW. 1671, 1671, 1679-80 (1984).
29 As the Archer Daniels Midland court noted:
[T]he "source" rule adopted in Franklin in no sense constitutes a license to violate the
refunding provision. The court is still required to make a finding of the true source of the
proceeds for redemption. Where the facts indicate that the proposed redemption was indirectly
funded by the proceeds of anticipated debt borrowed at a prohibited interest rate, such
redemption would be barred regardless of the name of the account from which the funds were
withdrawn. Thus, a different case would be before us if ADM, contemporaneously with the
redemption, issued new, lower-cost debt and used the proceeds of such debt to repurchase the
stock issued in the first instance to finance the original redemption. On those facts, the
redemption could arguably be said to have been indirectly funded through the proceeds of
anticipated lower-cost debt ....
Archer Daniels Midland, 570 F. Supp. at 1542 n.4. However, as Fisher and Greenfield note, even a more
expansive understanding of the source rule, one encompassing an "equity analysis," would still leave the
plaintiffs in Franklin and Archer Daniels Midland unsatisfied. Fisher & Greenfield, supra note 28, at
1680.
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times at the expense of the bondholder." 30 The weakness of the clause was such
that two suggestions were put forward to reinvigorate it.31 The fixes were to
insert language that prohibited the calling of bonds with interest rates above the
average market interest rate of comparable bonds (at the time of the call), or
that prevented the calling of bonds when the issuer borrowed at a lower interest
rate within a specific, enumerated time period before or after the call.32
Despite its problems, the refunding clause, in the same unimproved state
as was employed in ADM's bonds, did not disappear after the ADM episode. In
fact, the ADM case has been cited as an example of how "the language of
publicly issued debt covenants changes slowly, if at all, even after events seem
to have established a need for new language." 33 It also seems that the market
may have continued to value refunding provisions.34 A brief, informal survey
of bond summaries in the Moody's Industrial Manual for 1992 reveals several
examples of bonds, issued after ADM, that appear to have the same refunding
clause protection as the ADM bonds.35 The Appendix lists the fourteen
examples. A more systemic sample, again based on the Moody's manual, was
also taken as an initial empirical observation. Those observations suggest that
30 James E. Spiotto, Early Redemption and Leveraged Buyouts: All That Glitters May Not Be
Valid, Binding and Enforceable-the Erosion of Covenants, Confidence or Responsibility?, in HIGH-
YIELD BONDS 1990, at *21, *25 (PLI Real Estate & Practice, Course Handbook Series No. N4-4543,
1990), available at 364 PLIIReal 21 (Westlaw). For a similar assessment of the legal relationship
between bondholders and issuers on this topic, although offering a different solution, see Robert S.
Blanc & Randy D. Gordon, Reforming the Unbargained Contract: Avoiding Bondholder Claims for
Surprise Par Calls, 55 BUS. LAW. 317, 349 (1999) ("Existing paradigms of liability for wrongful par
calls are inadequate.").
31 Fisher & Greenfield, supra note 28, at 1681.
32 Id.
33 John C. Coffee, Jr. & William A. Klein, Bondholder Coercion: The Problem of
Constrained Choice in Debt Tender Offers and Recapitalizations, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 1207, 1254 n.136
(1991). Coffee and Klein suggest that "investors like Morgan Stanley continued to accept the same
language in obligations issued after the decision." Id. Note that these assertions are somewhat in tension
with the results of this Note's bond covenant survey, although it is not clear that the observed drop in the
use of refunding covenants was solely the result of the court's decision inADM See infra Section III.B.
While Coffee and Klein suggest that the market had little reaction to ADM, they do allow, however,
that some issuers probably did not intend to refund and that informal sanctions may play a role. Coffee
& Klein, supra, at 1254 n.136. See discussion infra Section II.C for more on reputation-based
mechanisms.
34 One study of bonds from 1980 to 1986 found that refunding clauses reduced the yield
issuers had to pay for calls. Richard J. Kish, Valuation: Call Options and Deferments on Corporate
Bonds, 7 PA. EcON. REV. 77, 77, 83 (1999); see also infra note 44 and accompanying text. But see
David S. Allen et al., Agency Costs and Alternative Call Provisions: An Empirical Investigation, FIN.
MGMT., Winter 1987, at 37, 40, 43-44 (concluding from a January 1970 to June 1983 sample of bonds
that no value was conferred for refunding clauses, thus posing the question of why refunding clauses
have continued in use). Note that Kish's dataset begins before ADM and ends after, so Kish's work
cannot serve as unambiguous evidence of the market placing value on refunding clauses after ADM was
decided.
35 MOODY'S INVESTORS SERV., MOODY'S INDUSTRIAL MANUAL 1992 (1992) [hereinafter
MOODY'S 1992]. Moody's does not provide actual indenture language, but does summarize the relevant
bond covenants. For reasons noted below, there is good cause to believe that the refunding clauses in
each of these bonds are not substantially different from those provided in the ADM 16% debentures'
indenture. See infra notes 157-160 and accompanying text.
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the number of bonds utilizing refunding clauses did indeed drop sharply in the
period after ADM, though the sample also reveals other changes in bond
structuring as well. This initial look suggests that many forces were at work in
this period, and that future empirical work should be carried out keeping these
various effects in mind. A discussion of these alternative explanations and the
relationship between the initial empirical observations and the explanations
offered in this Note is given below.36 Although they do not seem to have had
the same level of popularity in the mid to late 1980s as they did before,
refunding clauses do appear to have survived for some applications. The
following Part considers some of the reasons why that might be.
II. Possible Reasons for the Continued Viability of Refunding Clauses
A. Investors Ignore Indenture Terms and Their Enforceability
One potential reason that these clauses continued to be seen is that
investors simply do not pay attention to the bond indenture. For instance, it
seems clear that bondholders, at least in some instances, do not read the
materials describing their securities. In one redemption case, "[t]he trial court
found and the class conceded that none of these purchasers read the prospectus.
Instead, they relied on their stockbrokers and/or various other sources of
information." 37 Anecdotally, it seems that a number of investors, including
professionals, fail to read documentation.
38
It is hard to claim that the documentation, if evaluated, would not have
cured investor ignorance about the refunding clause's weaknesses. In ADM,
Franklin, and other cases where bonds were to be retired before refunding
provisions expired, plaintiffs alleged 1 Ob-5 claims of failure to disclose or of
material misrepresentation; in all but one case, these claims failed.39 In the
absence of insufficient materials, any ignorance explanation must turn on a
failure to properly or adequately analyze the bonds' disclosures.
One such explanation is that investors may be aware of the bond
indenture's provisions, but may decide not to focus any energy on the legal
details. In ADM, a Morgan Stanley salesman was quoted as stating that
the question whether a court would ultimately find that a call was lawful or
unlawful was largely irrelevant to my view of the economic risks for
36 See infra Section III.B.
37 Lucas v. Fla. Power & Light Co., 765 F.2d 1039, 1041 (1 1th Cir. 1985).
38 WILSON & FABOZZI, supra note 6, at 174-75; see also Blanc & Gordon, supra note 30, at
321 ("[Head bond traders] rarely study the indenture, but rely on the underwriters' 'talk' and on the
preliminary prospectus, or 'red herring."').
39 Lucas, 765 F.2d at 1040, 1043-46; Associated Builders, Inc. v. Ala. Power Co., 505 F.2d
97, 99-102 (5th Cir. 1974); Morgan Stanley & Co. v. Archer Daniels Midland Co., 570 F. Supp. 1529,
1536-38 (S.D.N.Y. 1983); Franklin Life Ins. Co. v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 451 F. Supp. 602, 606-
11 (S.D. Ill. 1978), aff'dper curiam, 598 F.2d 1109 (7th Cir. 1979). Only in Harris v. Union Elec. Co.,
787 F.2d 355, 360-72 (8th Cir. 1986), did the plaintiffs prevail on the misrepresentation claim.
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bondholders if any corporation announced a call .... No portfolio manager with
whom I have dealt has ever expressed to me a view, one way or the other, as to
whether a call ... would violate the nonrefunding provisions....40
To the extent that investors feel that their legal acumen is too limited to
create useful expectations for legal questions, it may be rational and value-
maximizing for such investors to focus their analytical resources elsewhere. If
the market were mostly composed of such investors, then the weakened legal
protection of the refunding clause would not be cause to remove the language
from future bond issues.
This explanation-that there exist risks that the market simply overlooks
or ignores-is unsatisfactory, as it lies in such strong tension with the notion of
efficient capital markets.4 ' While it is possible to construct situations,
especially for small investors, where the marginal gain from investigating the
legal implications of an indenture is so minimal as to make ignorance rational,
the frequency of such situations is bounded by the no-arbitrage principle. At
some point, the gains from exploiting inaccurate debt pricing make reading the
indenture or having a lawyer check the document profitable. It seems highly
plausible that at least institutional investors, who can spread out the fixed costs
of maintaining a legal staff over many different bonds, would engage in this
strategy at some point, reining in inefficient pricing.42 The notion that the
weakness of refunding clauses went unnoticed is even less tenable when one
considers the publicity calling attention to ADM (and to the circumvention of
refunding prohibitions through replacement and maintenance funds), which
should have made professionals aware of the implications of these
developments for the possibility of early bond calls.43 The explanation for any
persistence of refunding clauses lies beyond any version of ignorance.
40 Archer Daniels Midland, 570 F. Supp. at 1537.
41 The efficient capital markets hypothesis has been more fully explored for equity markets;
for a review of empirical work see Eugene F. Fama, Efficient Capital Markets: 11, 46 J. FIN. 1575
(1991). Despite the number of anomalies and market imperfections that have been raised, it seems that
stock markets are still very efficient. See Burton G. Malkiel, The Efficient Market Hypothesis and Its
Critics, 17 J. ECON. PERSP. 59 (2003). Given the level of efficiency in equity markets, for debt markets
to be inefficient seems incredibly unlikely. But not all commentators agree. "Whatever may be urged
about the efficiency of the stock market ... the market for bonds... is considerably less efficient in
reflecting the absence or import of many protective covenants." Brudney, supra note 5, at 1827; see
also id at 1850 & n.88, 1851 & n.90, 1852, 1875. Refunding covenants are specifically noted. Id. at
1851 n.90, 1875 n. 173. On covenant pricing, see supra note 34 and infra notes 44, 57.
42 Indeed it seems that investors do have some balance between always, or never, assessing
their legal rights. After a discussion with four money managers (who managed a total of approximately
twenty-five billion in assets), in which all admitted to not reading prospectuses nor knowing anyone who
did, one author still noted that "[tlo infer that all money managers and other analysts do not read
prospectuses is a quantum and incorrect leap." Charles A. D'Ambrosio, Three Stories: The Good 01'
Summertime, FtN. ANALYSTS J., Sept.-Oct. 1983, at 10, 10. However, the author retained "uneasy
feelings ... about the number that do," asking, "[i]s there a delusionary safe harbor in believing too
strongly that all known information is reflected in market prices and well diversified portfolios insure
against all but market-related risks?" Id.
43 Fisher & Greenfield published an article for lawyers on ADM in 1984, see Fisher &
Greenfield, supra note 28; see also Spiotto, supra note 30 (discussing the ADM issue in a 1990 article
targeted at lawyers), and the Wall Street Journal reported on the decision shortly after it was handed
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B. Refunding Clauses Could Be Priced as Retaining Diminished Legal Value
Call provisions, as well as refunding protections, seem to be priced by
bond investors. One study of corporate bond prices from 1980 through 1986
found that call provisions were valued at approximately sixty basis points, and
that call protection in the form of refunding restrictions aided the issuer by
reducing the yield demanded by investors. 44 Thus another possible explanation
for the continued viability of refunding clauses is that investors were aware of
the legal weakening of the clauses, but reacted only by decreasing their
willingness to concede yield, in order to reflect the lowered probability of
successful legal enforcement. As noted by the ADM court, since Franklin was
decided outside of New York, there was still some small chance, albeit slight,
of Morgan Stanley winning its action against ADM.4 5 Given this possibility of
success, a rational reaction from investors would be to continue to give issuers
some price benefit, but properly scaled down for the decreased likelihood of
successfully enforcing the clause.
If investors were still willing to assess refunding clauses as providing
some value, then companies would choose to leave them in bond indentures.
Kahan and Klausner offer a "switching costs" explanation for the persistence of
some features of bond indentures: "When internal learning or network benefits
are present, they result in 'switching costs' which may induce a firm to adopt
the same term repeatedly in different documents-for instance, in different
indentures. ' 'A6 As the refunding clause language had already been drafted, and
both issuers' counsel and management already understood the clause and its
source rule requirement, issuers would be inclined to stick with the same
language despite its reduced efficacy. This explanation, however, hinges on
investors giving issuers some credit for the presence of refunding clauses after
ADM. Kahan and Klausner's "switching costs" story is viable for the
distinction between using older versions of legal provisions rather than
improved ones, 47 but would not explain retaining a worthless covenant in the
indenture rather than dropping it. The costs of adopting a different provision
might exceed the benefits, but arguably the costs of simply dropping a covenant
down, Morgan Stanley's Suit Against Archer-Daniels Is Voided in Large Part, WALL ST. J., Aug. 25,
1983, at 25. The analogous avoidance of call protection through replacement and maintenance funds was
also covered by that newspaper in 1977. See Florida P&L to Redeem Bonds in Unusual Way, WALL ST.
J., June 21, 1977, at 36; Lindley B. Richert, Issuers of High-Yield Bonds May Use Little-Known Method
of Early Retirement, WALL ST. J., May 9, 1977, at 30.
44 Kish, supra note 34, at 77, 83. The specific value of a call deferment is disputed and
estimates vary. Id at 78, 82, 84 n.16; Allen et al., supra note 34, at 43 (finding, contrary to Kish, that
refunding clauses do not reduce yields).
45 Archer Daniels Midland, 570 F. Supp. at 1542. Indeed, Morgan Stanley contended both
that its case could be distinguished, and that Franklin had been wrongly decided. Id. at 1540.
46 Marcel Kahan & Michael Klausner, Standardization and Innovation in Corporate
Contracting (or "the Economics of Boilerplate"'), 83 VA. L. REV. 713, 727 (1997).
47 Kahan and Klausner present empirical evidence of the impact of switching costs in the
context of event risk covenants, where certain forms persisted despite improved versions. Id. at 752.
Vol. 23:121, 2006
The Curiosity of Refunding Clauses
are nearly zero. If issuers were not to receive any benefit from the presence of a
refunding clause, then switching costs of zero would not stand in the way of
removing the language. Indeed, in the absence of any investor-conferred
benefit, issuers would be loathe to include the refunding clause because it
would still have the downside potential of sparking costly, even if ultimately
futile, litigation in the event the issuer called the bonds.
This litigation cost that a bondholder could inflict upon issuers, even if the
probability of victory is low, leads to another explanation for why investors
might still value a refunding clause. In a sense, call provisions are not
necessary for issuers to capitalize on falling interest rates. Emery and Lewellen
show that when non-callable debt trades at a premium because of lower interest
rates, it is possible that tax consequences would allow companies to refund
profitably through a strategy of repurchasing the existing debt at a premium and
issuing new debt at lower interest rates.48 They argue that this tax gain creates a
margin that enables issuers to execute the refunding strategy with a tender for
non-callable debt at above-market prices.49 In their model, transaction costs
limit the opportunities for profitable refunding through open-market
repurchases, so they posit that one possible advantage of callable debt is that it
lowers such costs. 5However, a key feature of a call is that it allows the issuer
to avoid negotiation with bondholders, negotiation which must take place if the
bonds are to be retired in an open-market repurchase. 5I If the issuer's gain is
tax-driven, then avoiding negotiation is crucial. Because so many companies
are public, it is possible that sophisticated institutional bondholders would be
able to use financial disclosures to estimate the issuer's tax gains. Once
bondholders have a sense of the issuer's gains and thus its reservation price, the
issuer is exposed to the possibility that the only acceptable tender offers would
be those which are so high that the issuer is left with little final benefit. Having
a call provision avoids the messiness of negotiation and the possible loss of
surplus to bondholders.52
48 Douglas R. Emery & Wilbur G. Lewellen, Refunding Non-callable Debt, 19 J. FIN. &
QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 73 (1984).
49 Id. at 78.
50 Id. at 80.
51 Gordon Pye, The Value of the Call Option on a Bond, 74 J. POL. ECON. 200, 200 (1966)
(suggesting that issuers value calls as a way to avoid bargaining, and the resulting premiums, when
changing covenants). Such a view has also been discussed in the context of the impact of calls on
agency issues, see infra note 63.
52 Emery & Lewellen, supra note 48, do not address the issue of surplus division.
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When part of a call's value is seen as cost containment,53 it becomes clear
that having a refunding clause still provides bondholders with some protection,
since the source rule requires issuers to raise redemption funds from a source
other than borrowing, thus increasing the transactions costs of a refunding.
54
Additionally, the bondholder's contractual claim, which has some probability
of success, can be litigated to further raise the transactions costs of an issuer's
refunding. 55 By increasing costs, the clause can potentially limit the issuer's
ability to refund profitably. The specific power of the refunding clause when
deployed in this fashion depends on the relative magnitudes of the costs and
benefits.
56
It seems quite possible that refunding clauses have continued utility
because investors reassess the clauses as having diminished, but still
discernable, value. If this is the case, the impact of this revised view would be
felt in the prices of all bonds with refunding clauses. Prices of outstanding
bonds with refunding clauses would fall, while the offering spreads of newly
issued bonds with refunding clauses would rise. If the driving factor is the
decision of courts to interpret the refunding clause according to the source rule,
then this price effect would likely be felt across all issuers. Even if a good deal
of the clause's value is derived from the increased transactions costs a
refunding clause imposes on any refunding, similarities across issuers as to
costs suggests that price effects would still be widespread. Ultimately, any
reassessment by investors of the value of refunding clauses in general is likely
to result in a negative price impact on all bonds with such clauses, regardless of
issuer.
57
53 Pye suggests another way in which transactions costs, besides those from raising new
capital, play a role in making calls valuable. Pye notes that if an issuer wants to reduce debt,
[e]ssentially the same effect as retiring his own bonds could be obtained by buying on the
market similar bonds issued by someone else. However, because of the transactions costs
involved in making interest payments, the costs of bonds to the issuer will always be somewhat
greater than their value on the market. There will therefore be some saving to the issuer in
retiring his own bonds rather than buying someone else's.
Pye, supra note 51, at 200 (emphasis added).
54 Getting funds from a non-debt source may entail issuing equity. Not only would a stock
offering have underwriting and other such costs, but may have further costs if the issuer must solicit
proxies to get shareholder authorization to issue more stock.
55 This strategy is not costless to investors, however, as bondholders would also have to
expend litigation costs.
56 Considering the numerical example given in Emery & Lewellen, supra note 48, at 77-78, it
seems that the magnitude of extra underwriting or litigation costs must be relatively large to make it
unprofitable for an issuer to refund. Also, issuers may not actually factor transactions costs into
refunding decisions. A study of the timing of calls, examining how long issuers wait after a bond trades
above the exercise price before calling, finds that transactions costs are not significant in determining the
length of such delays in bond calls. Tao-Hsien Dolly King & David C. Mauer, Corporate Call Policy for
Nonconvertible Bonds, 73 J. Bus. 403, 428 (2000). King and Mauer eliminated all bonds with refunding
restrictions from their data sample, id at 406, but the study is still informative for general bond call
practices of management.
57 Issuers can certainly differ as to costs; some may have better banking relationships and thus
obtain lower underwriting fees, while others may have more or less restrictive corporate charters, giving
management more or less flexibility to raise capital without shareholder approval. Nevertheless, it seems
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C. An Extralegal Alternative: Reputation and Investor Retaliation
Refunding clauses may have continued viability for some issuers if a
portion of the clause's value lies outside of the judicial system. The main value
of the clause may reside beyond the reaches of legal enforcement if the clause's
ultimate goal is to create a fine division of rights58 between issuers and
investors, where issuers retain the flexibility of being able to call the bonds for
"legitimate" business reasons but implicitly pledge that they will not compete
with bondholders for the gains from market changes in interest rates. A fall in
the general level of interest rates, from economic changes unrelated to the
issuer, or a contraction of the issuer's credit spread, for reasons specific to that
individual company, will cause the price of investors' bonds to rise, as these
bonds now have interest rates that are relatively more attractive compared to
new bonds then available in the marketplace. A way for an issuer to seize this
gain from bondholders would be to call the bonds at a below-market price and
issue new ones at lower interest rates, thus capturing the present value of the
interest differential. 59 The refunding clause can serve as a signal that issuers
that the differences in such costs would be relatively small across companies, and would be swamped by
the price impact of any reevaluation by investors of the fundamental legal enforceability of refunding
clauses.
The analysis in Kish, supra note 34, uses data that spans the time both before and after ADM, and
thus that work is unable to help answer whether there was a widespread price effect. The contradictory
study of Allen et al., supra note 34, covers only until June 1983 and so is also unhelpful. The price
impact of having a maintenance and replacement (M&R) fund or having a funnel sinking fund, both
used by some issuers to call debt before the end of refunding protection, see cases cited and text
accompanying infra notes 110-128, has been studied by Laber. Gene Laber, Bond Covenants and
Managerial Flexibility: Two Cases of Special Redemption Provisions, FIN. MGMT., Spring 1990, at 82.
Laber finds that from 1980 to 1982, having a M&R fund with special redemption prices increased
yields, offsetting the benefit of having this fund without special call prices. Id. at 85-89. However, the
study did not find that the existence of a funnel sinking fund had any impact on reoffering yields. Id. at
89. The result for M&R funds suggests that perhaps there may be widespread price effects, but the result
for funnel sinking funds clouds this conclusion. Also, the study is useful for M&R fund redemptions, as
it looks at a period after Florida Power & Light's redemption using a M&R fund broke the ice, but the
period examined is still before ADM, so it is hard to draw from Laber's work any clean conclusions for
refunding clauses. For more context on M&R funds and funnel sinking funds, see discussion infra
accompanying notes 113-128. It should also be noted that the notion of price impacts from covenants,
even those regarding refunding or coercive tenders, is in tension with some commentators who assert
that price may not actually capture all such risk. See Brudney, supra note 5, at 1850 & n.88, 1851 &
n.90, 1852; Coffee & Klein, supra note 33, at 1252.
58 Allen, Lamy, and Thompson allude to the notion of the "spirit" of the refunding clause,
recognizing the possibility that issuers will violate this "spirit" because the clause is not enforceable,
when introducing their empirical study on the value of refunding clauses. Allen et al., supra note 34, at
39, 42, 44. They do not, however, elaborate on what the "spirit" of the clause is, or how enforcement
might be accomplished through extra-legal means.
59 This calculation would have to account for transaction costs and tax consequences also. See
WILSON & FABozzI, supra note 6, at 184; see also Pye, supra note 51, at 200-03 (giving a more formal
model of the timing of bond calls). Note, however, that the decision to call, whether or not for refunding,
can be complicated. Also, being able to call at a below-market price is not required for a refunding
operation to benefit an issuer's shareholders, although having the call has distinct advantages, see supra
text accompanying notes 48-52. This sort of issuer behavior may not be too pervasive. King and
Mauer's empirical study, spanning from 1975 to 1994, suggests that only a fraction of calls (372 in their
sample of 1642 called bonds) are refundings, where refunding was defined as issuing new debt within a
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will not partake in such actions, allowing investors to price the bonds on that
assumption. Once an issuer has represented such intentions, and has been
compensated with lower yields, investors can penalize the issuer through
reputation effects in future transactions if the issuer later defects from its
commitment not to take market gains.
The role of an issuer's credit spread in the price of its bonds adds an
additional nuance to this division of market gains from non-market gains. The
refunding clause does not prohibit retiring bonds out of operating revenue. If an
issuer's credit spread is narrowing because of business successes that bring in
free cash flow, then issuers are still allowed to employ that excess cash to
benefit shareholders by retiring debt and accruing interest cost savings, even
though this action simultaneously destroys some bondholder value. Note that in
this setting, shareholder gains are related to the interest rate of the existing
bonds, but do not depend on the market difference between the issuer's credit
spread in existing bonds and the issuer's new, narrower credit spread. While
this sort of transaction is likely to take place concurrently with a market gain
for holders of the existing bonds, it is not dependent on market changes-an
issuer could execute such a transaction profitably even if the market failed to
react to the improvement in cash flow.60 If the credit spread narrows for other
reasons, such as general optimism about an issuer's sector, then the refunding
clause's implicit issuer-investor pact still serves to bar opportunistic refundings
that attempt to capture such market gains.
Besides use of free cash flow, there are other non-market, business
reasons for redeeming debt that would be considered "legitimate," even if the
issuer is relying on a capital infusion that is only technically distinguishable
from borrowing. Agency issues have been argued by some authors as a reason
for having calls, including those with refunding protection, 6 1 embedded in
debt.62 Retiring debt may be necessary to give an issuer the proper incentives
for future investment,63 even if the issuer is not near bankruptcy.64 Information
12-month period bracketing the call. King & Mauer, supra note 56, at 433. Allen, Lamy, and Thompson
tried to determine empirically "[t]he actual behavior of firms calling non-refundable debt," but had
inconclusive results. Allen et al., supra note 34, at 39 n.6.
60 A decision to retire existing funds is related to the market indirectly, in that the decision to
call bonds is only rational if a company has no other high return applications for the cash-that is, if the
best investment available to the company is its own bonds at the call price. See Pye, supra note 51, at
200 (noting the similarity between debt retirement and investment in similar bonds). Even this view of
redemptions, however, does not involve a direct market play on moving interest rates in the same sense
as the activities of bond market investors.
61 Janet S. Thatcher, The Choice of Call Provision Terms: Evidence of the Existence of
Agency Costs of Debt, 40 J. FIN. 549 (1985). Thatcher's argument is discussed below. See infra notes
66-71 and accompanying text.
62 On various agency issues arising from debt, see generally Amir Bamea et al., Market
Imperfections, Agency Problems, and Capital Structure, FIN. MGMT., Summer 1981, at 7.
63 It has been shown that while non-callable debt reduces shareholders' incentive to invest,
relative to a firm funded by equity only, call provisions can correct this distortion. Zvi Bodie & Robert
A. Taggart, Jr., Future Investment Opportunities and the Value of the Call Provision on a Bond, 33 J.
FIN. 1187 (1978) [hereinafter Bodie & Taggart, Investment Opportunities]. Non-callable debt is
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asymmetry and shareholders' tendency to shift towards riskier projects after
issuing debt are two other agency problems that calls can mitigate.65 Thatcher
argues that calls with refunding prohibitions serve to resolve these agency
problems while protecting bondholders from interest rate risk, but assumes that
refunding clauses are enforceable. 66 From a sample of bond issuances over six
months of 1975, Thatcher produces empirical evidence that firms with larger
agency costs issue bonds with refunding clauses, suggesting that such calls are
used to reduce agency costs. 67 Although relying on extra-judicial enforcement
narrows shareholder discretion in using a call with a refunding prohibition,6
8
such a call can reduce agency problems69 to some extent by restoring proper
investment incentives. Yet the explanation of the refunding clause discussed
here, because of the implicit understanding it requires and the extra-judicial
enforcement it necessitates, would suggest that a call with a refunding
restriction is less helpful in resolving the other two agency problems of
asymmetric information and asset substitution.
71
problematic because some benefits from profitable investments aid bondholders, by reducing the
probability of default, so that shareholders internalize less than 100% of the benefits of any investment
and thus face reduced incentives. Id. at 1188. Calling debt solves this problem by allowing an interest
rate reset so that shareholders reap the full benefit of later investments. Id. Others have described this
role for calls less as a solution to an agency dilemma than as a way of reducing negotiation costs from a
Coasean bargaining between bondholders and shareholders to split the surplus that arises when the
appropriate investment occurs. Varouj A. Aivazian & Jeffrey L. Callen, Future Investment
Opportunities and the Value of the Call Provision on a Bond: Comment, 35 J. FiN. 1051 (1980); Bodie
& Taggart, Investment Opportunities, supra 1197 n.13; Zvi Bodie & Robert A. Taggart, Jr., Future
Investment Opportunities and the Value of the Call Provision on a Bond: Reply, 35 J. FIN. 1055 (1980).
64 Coffee and Klein give scenarios in a similar vein as the argument of Bodie & Taggart,
Investment Opportunities, supra note 63, but involving distressed debt trading below par, where scaling
back bond claims reallocates gains (away from restoring bond prices) so that equity has the right
investment incentives. Coffee & Klein, supra note 33, at 1234-41. Yet shareholder incentives are
important even when bonds are not trading below par. See supra note 63.
65 Barnea, Haugen, and Senbet discuss these problems along with the issue of investment
incentives, noting that all of these problems can be solved by either calls or shorter maturities. Amir
Barnea et al., A Rationale for Debt Maturity Structure and Call Provisions in the Agency Theoretic
Framework, 35 J. FIN. 1223, 1225-33 (1980).
66 Thatcher, supra note 61, at 551-52.
67 Id. at 552-60.
68 A straight call would permit an issuer to call for more than just the "legitimate" business
reasons described here.
69 It is noted above, see supra note 63, that interest rate resets restore incentives, but
refunding is not required. Rather it is debt extinguishment that is needed, so that 100% of investment
benefits accrue to shareholders; payment from equity or other sources should suffice. Bodie and
Taggart's example does not use refunding, Bodie & Taggart, Investment Opportunities, supra note 63, at
1192 n.7, and it seems generally to be unnecessary, see id. at 1198.
70 But empirical evidence on the investment issue is weak. See Thatcher, supra note 61, at
555, 557-58.
71 The argument here that investors can discern calls for "legitimate" business reasons from
those done purely as market plays suggests a familiarity with the issuer that precludes severe
informational asymmetry. Barnea, Haugen, and Senbet's argument that calls alleviate shareholder
tendencies for asset substitution because such shifting decreases the value of the issuer's call, Barnea et
al., supra note 65, at 1227-30, suggests that issuers treat their own debt as vehicles for market activity,
an attitude that is inconsistent with the "good faith" division that the current hypothesis ascribes to
issuers.
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Besides agency concerns, another "legitimate" business reason for an
issuer to call debt would be if there were restrictive covenants preventing it
from pursuing a beneficial business venture. 72 Or, the issuer may simply have
to reduce debt in order to partake in a beneficial transaction, as was the case in
Katz v. Oak Industries, Inc.73 There, Oak Industries was under duress and
needed a cash injection, in the form of a stock and warrants purchase, from
Allied-Signal; Allied-Signal conditioned this infusion on an 85% reduction in
Oak Industries' debt.74 Oak Industries' bonds were trading well below par75 so
that refunding was not possible, but the case illustrates that needing to reduce
debt is a situation where calls would greatly facilitate a productive business
transaction. 76 These reasons for managerial freedom seem eminently reasonable
and compelling. Estimates of their importance should, however, be tempered
by empirical work which questions the extent to which such reasons underlie an
issuer's policies for using call provisions.
77
Nevertheless, managers may very well value having some discretion to
partake in such actions. Using the refunding clause with its informal
understanding would then be an intermediate method of obtaining such
freedom; the issuer would have more options than with non-callable debt, but
72 One possibility is where an issuer has a merger proposal that would create many operating
synergies, but is blocked by the counterpart's refusal to take on the issuer's more restrictive covenants.
The refusal here is a function of another form of Kahan and Klausner's "switching costs": "the inclusion
of a stricter covenant in a subsequent indenture... confers an uncompensated windfall on existing
bondholders (who would benefit from the company's compliance with the later restriction)." Kahan &
Klausner, supra note 46, at 728. Pye, supra note 51, at 200, also suggests removing covenants as a
reason for calls. While make-whole calls are very different from the calls of interest here, surveys of
thoughts on make-whole calls can offer insights on managerial attitudes toward debt. A descriptive
survey of chief financial officers suggests that getting rid of "troublesome" covenants would be a
motivating factor for exercising a make-whole call. Steven V. Mann & Eric A. Powers, Indexing a
Bond's Call Price: An Analysis of Make-Whole Call Provisions, 9 J. CORP. FIN. 535, 552-53 (2003).
Note that defeasance covenants may be another option for removing difficult covenants. Id. at 538 &
n.3.
73 Katz v. Oak Indus., Inc., 508 A.2d 873 (Del. Ch. 1986).
74 Id. at 875-77, 882. In Katz, Oak Industries had to use an exchange offer, in conjunction
with exit consents to rid the bonds of certain restrictive covenants, in order to effect the debt reduction.
Id. at 876-77. While a call provision with a refunding clause might not have solved all of Oak Industries'
problems with its restrictive covenants, it would have helped eliminate the plaintiffs coercion theory, id.
at 879-80.
75 Id. at 875 n.2.
76 The underlying transaction with Allied-Signal has been considered positive, even though
the lack of call provisions left Oak Industries to employ an exit consent strategy--Coffee and Klein cite
Katz as an example of"Beneficial Coercion." Coffee & Klein, supra note 33, at 1241-42.
77 Empirical evidence on covenants as the reason for calls is mixed. King and Mauer give
evidence that removing more restrictive covenants may be a motive for some portion of bond calls, King
& Mauer, supra note 56, at 435, while also showing that the restrictiveness of covenants does not seem
to impact the length of delay between bonds trading above a call price and an issuer's exercise of the
call, id. at 428. King and Mauer also show that while equity values react to changes in leverage from
bond calls and refundings, id. at 437-39, covenants are not significant explanatory factors for such
equity impacts when tax implications are accounted for, id. at 441.
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still fewer than those provided by callable debt.78  This intermediate
functionality should lead to a similarly intermediate cost being exacted by bond
investors. 79 It seems likely that managers would be willing to pay some amount
of increased interest for these privileges.80 A nuanced understanding with
investors evidenced by the inclusion of a refunding clause could serve as an
attractive balance of costs and freedoms.
8 1
The compromise nature of this understanding of the refunding clause can
make court policing of this fine division, of benefits for bondholders and
privileges for managers, difficult. A court must always consider the impact of a
precedent beyond the specific parties to a dispute, but this focus is heightened
in disputes over boilerplate contracts in capital markets because of the
especially high value of uniformity and clarity in this context.8 2 Determinations
can be especially confused when there are concurrent issuances of equity and
lower interest debt, as was the situation in ADM. 3 Given these pressures, it is
78 As noted above, the inclusion or exclusion of a call feature is not determinative of whether
a company can redeem its bonds, but rather the ease with which it is done. See supra notes 48-50, 74
and accompanying text.
79 Economic studies suggest investors do indeed provide some yield reduction when pricing a
call, if an issuer provides refunding protection; however, some question the accuracy of pricing. See
supra notes 34, 44, 57.
80 A 1991 survey of chief financial officers found that only 9.0% would include "covenants
offering strong protection" if they were to issue bonds in the next six months; 43.8% would include
"covenants offering some protection" while the plurality, 47.2%, would not attach any covenants. CFO
Forum: Is Anyone Paying Any Heed to Bondholders?, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR, Feb. 1991, at 123,
123. Coffee and Klein interpret this survey as suggesting "strong managerial resistance to stronger
covenants or to other changes that would restrict managerial discretion." Coffee & Klein, supra note 33,
at 1252 n. 131. They argue that it is evidence that managers, out of risk aversion, may be willing to pay
for the right to make coercive tender offers to avoid bankruptcy. Id. at 1252-53. Although make-whole
calls are different, the Mann and Powers descriptive survey on them is helpful in ascertaining
managerial attitudes; their work suggests that chief financial officers feel "financial flexibility" is
important and a good reason for including make-whole calls on debt. Mann & Powers, supra note 72, at
552. The lack, however, of clear empirical understanding of managerial call policies, see King & Mauer,
supra note 56, at 404 (giving evidence of issuers waiting to call bonds long after prices made such calls
advantageous); supra notes 56, 77, cautions against over-emphasizing manager conceptions of the value
of calls.
81 Cost seems to play into managers' considerations. Although it is not argued here that make-
whole calls have the same function as calls with refunding protection, looking to the make-whole call
survey data compiled by Mann and Powers is still informative of managers' mindsets: "[w]hen asked
why firms would use a make-whole call provision rather than a fixed-price call provision, the
overwhelming rationale is that the upfront cost of a make-whole call provision is substantially
lower... Mann & Powers, supra note 72, at 553. These same chief financial officers, however,
thought make-wholes were costless, which the article showed empirically is not the case. Id. at 536.
82 See Sharon Steel Corp. v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 691 F.2d 1039, 1048 (2d Cir.
1982). In holding that interpretation of boilerplate provisions were a matter of law, the Sharon court
noted that:
Moreover, uniformity in interpretation is important to the efficiency of capital markets....
Whereas participants in the capital market can adjust their affairs according to a uniform
interpretation, whether it be correct or not as an initial proposition, the creation of enduring
uncertainties as to the meaning of boilerplate provisions would decrease the value of all
debenture issues and greatly impair the efficient working of capital markets.
Id.
83 Morgan Stanley & Co. v. Archer Daniels Midland Co., 570 F. Supp. 1529, 1531-32
(S.D.N.Y. 1983).
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not surprising that the courts opted for a clearer, cleaner source rule,84 rather
than attempting a more discretion-laden determination of whether management
transgressed the boundary between market and non-market operations.
8 5
The refusal of courts to pass judgment on whether an issuer breached the
implicit compact of the refunding clause does not mean that investors cannot
make this determination. With issuers that return to the bond market repeatedly,
investors have an opportunity to retaliate through purchasing new bonds only at
steep yields. 86 A formal model of reputation and dependency on next period
gains is beyond the scope of this Note. Here, it suffices to observe that such
models have been advanced in the literature. Telser puts forward a simple,
repeated transaction model that can be analogized to roughly fit the current
situation. 87 Note that Telser's conditions for a self-enforcing agreement are met
84 Id. at 1542; Franklin Life Ins. Co. v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 451 F. Supp. 602, 614
(S.D. Ill. 1978), aff'd per curiam, 598 F.2d 1109 (7th Cir. 1979). In ruling on the motion for a
preliminary injunction, the ADM court observed that Morgan Stanley's suggested
case-by-case approach is problematic in a number of respects. First, it appears keyed to the
subjective expectations of the bondholders; if it appears that the redemption is funded through
lower-cost borrowing, based on the Company's recent or prospective borrowing history, the
redemption is deemed unlawful. The approach thus reads a subjective element into what
presumably should be an objective determination based on the language appearing in the bond
agreement. Second, and most important, this approach would likely cause greater uncertainty
among bondholders than a strict "source" rule such as that adopted in Franklin ....
Archer Daniels Midland, 570 F. Supp. at 1535-36. Courts strive for objectivity; thus the realm of
business judgments on relationship management (where seeking to drive out subjectivity seems at best
futile, and at worst, dangerously misguided) seems best addressed outside of the courts. But see
Brudney, supra note 5, at 1848-49 (arguing that judicial recognition of coercion would make substantive
fairness decisions possible).
85 Brudney argues that such concerns should not stop courts from judging whether good faith
obligations are met, and that in such decisions, courts should favor dispersed bondholders more than
single lenders because of the inherent differences in bargaining power-individual lenders are better
able to bargain over and understand the shortcomings of specific covenants. See Brudney, supra note 5,
at 1869-75, 1877-78.
86 Morey W. McDaniel, Bondholders and Corporate Governance, 41 BUS. LAW. 413, 434
(1986) ("A company with a reputation for hurting its bondholders will find it more difficult to sell bonds
in the future."); William W. Bratton, Jr., Corporate Debt Relationships: Legal Theory in a Time of
Restructuring, 1989 DUKE L.J. 92, 141 ("[M]anagers had passed up opportunities to injure bondholders
even when debt contracts posed no obstacle. According to the conventional wisdom, such opportunistic
conduct would lead creditors in future financings to impose unfavorable terms, the costs of which would
outweigh the benefits of present wealth transfers."). Neither author, however, is optimistic about the
effectiveness of reputational restraints, id. at 142; McDaniel, supra, at 434-35; see also infra note 104
and accompanying text.
87 L.G. Telser, A Theory of Self-enforcing Agreements, 53 J. Bus. 27 (1980). Analogizing
Telser's model (where enforcement comes only from termination), id. at 30-36, to the current bond
issuance scenario (where enforcement comes from worse pricing on bonds), can be done by
conceptualizing each bond issuance as the average of two separate streams of transactions. One
transaction stream is composed of debt that is cheap for the issuer and the other is made up of debt that
is expensive, with the average transaction stream being mutually beneficial. In this way, it is possible to
view a stream of bond issuances as a package of two self-enforcing agreements, with one (the cheap
debt) contingent on an understanding of the restrictions of the refunding clause. Defection from the
norm results in the termination of the cheap debt stream, while the stream of expensive debt continues.
The "cheap" and "expensive" labels here come from the point of view of the issuer, in that debt is
"cheap" because the issuer gets a price reduction for purchasing from investors not a full call but one
that is limited by a refunding clause. However, remember that the "cheap" debt is beneficial for both
parties. Investors want it because they want to sell the call limited by a refunding clause-an
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in the corporate bond issuance setting, at least for large companies and
institutional investors. Corporations are legally created to live forever, and the
types of institutions that invest in bonds are not generally created with a limited
period of time in mind.88 As long as a corporation or institutional investor is
large and in fairly stable financial health, that entity can be a party to
transactions that satisfy Telser's condition that self-enforcing agreements have
no known, certain end.89 Additionally, the nature of bonds is such that their
time horizon is necessarily long.90 Finally, Telser notes that one important
characteristic of self-enforcing agreements is that neither party expects the
agreements to be violated. 91 This behavior is seen in the refunding clause cases
discussed in this Note.
92
However, Telser's model is crafted for one buyer and one seller with
centralized decision-making, 93 and therefore is not a perfect fit for the current
situation. An issuer faces numerous bondholders. Yet institutional investors
may form a large enough block to have purchasing power, and with the
requisite sophistication and means of cooperation, they may be able to
approximate the retaliatory behavior of a single entity.94 Indeed, the need for
coordination can be seen as a reason for the refunding clause to increase in
value after ADM's bond call and the ensuing aftermath of investors penalizing
underpinning assumption of this analysis is that investors feel that even with the price discount they are
still getting a good deal. Thus, the "cheap" debt is beneficial for both parties, creating a self-enforcing
agreement through repeated transactions.
88 Regardless of the legal structuring of an entity's lifetime, presumably the individuals
running these entities are career investment professionals who continue to invest for an indeterminate
period into the future.
89 See id. at 44. McDaniel argues that this condition of Telser's is not met. McDaniel, supra
note 86, at 434-35, 435 n. 112; see also discussion infra note 104.
90 This fulfills another requirement of Telser's model. See Telser, supra note 87, at 44.
91 See id. ("The theory explains violations of a self-enforcing agreement as the response to
unexpected changes in the underlying factors that determine the terms of the agreement.").
92 Morgan Stanley alleged that reliance on the refunding protection was a vital part of its
decision to buy ADM's bonds, while ADM asserted that redemption not been considered until Merrill
Lynch suggested it two years after the bonds were issued. Morgan Stanley & Co. v. Archer Daniels
Midland Co., 570 F. Supp. 1529, 1533 (S.D.N.Y. 1983). In the state case in Harris, the court explicitly
noted that the
plaintiffs' understanding of the redemption protection is found[ed] largely on the fact that
special redemptions had never been pursued in the past. And, basically, plaintiffs assumed that
they would not be done in the future. UE's executives simply admit that they were not aware
of the possibility of a special redemption.
Harris v. Union Elec. Co., 622 S.W.2d 239, 248 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981); see also Lucas v. Fla. Power &
Light Co., 765 F.2d 1039, 1044 (11 th Cir. 1985).
93 See Telser, supra note 87, at 30.
94 Coffee and Klein suggest that some holders of distressed bonds can act in concert. Coffee
& Klein, supra note 33, at 1222 & n.49, 1232. But see Brudney, supra note 5, at 1824 & n.8, 1825-26,
1831, 1835 (arguing that dispersed bondholders cannot act as strategically as single lenders and get
worse terms and pricing than single lenders). It should also be noted that behavioral patterns will mimic
Telser's model if each investor is limited to thinking only in terms of their own actions relative to those
of the issuer; in other words, if the notion of lack of coordination is taken to the extreme and no investor
considers the actions of any other investor. Narrowing the scope of each investor's options in this way
simply reduces the problem to many simultaneous two-party situations.
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the company in later transactions. 95 This episode increased the value of
refunding clauses by providing a benefit akin to Kahan and Klausner's
"learning benefits." 96 Kahan and Klausner point out that judicial precedents
decrease uncertainty around covenants and thus increase the covenants' value
because companies are better able to get to desired results. 97 Although the
source rule judicial precedent from ADM did not help the vitality of the
refunding clause, the entirety of the episode, with the extra-judicial
enforcement exercised against ADM in its next bond offering, served to clarify
the clause's understood meaning for both investors and issuers, as well as
clarifying when retaliation is appropriate. The episode's benefits relate to the
need for coordinated investor action; tacit collective action is simpler if all of
the required actors know when they are supposed to conspire in retaliatory
action. Reductions in uncertainty can come not only from judicial precedents,
but also from precedent-setting market action. The resulting benefits accrue
both to those who use the boilerplate refunding language in later bonds, and
also to those who already had refunding clauses in existing bonds.
98
The extent of deviation from single entity behavior, however, still remains
to be treated in a formal model. In addition, there remain other non-self-reliant
means of coercing issuers to comply, such as recourse to courts (regardless of
how unlikely such a challenge is to succeed99). Any formal self-enforcement
model of the refunding clause would have to be more complex than that put
forth by Telser; however, viewing Telser's model as a skeletal outline suggests
that a self-enforced reputation explanation can account for at least some part of
the continued viability of refunding clauses.
Breaching the implicit understanding of the refunding clause may also
have a signaling impact on other aspects of an issuer's reputation. 00 If the
refunding clause is really a promise by management to refrain from taking
money away from bondholders to give it to shareholders through exploiting
bond market moves, then any breaches of this refunding clause pact should
adversely affect the issuer's reputation in other areas that are also, at heart,
questions of whether managers are willing to expropriate bondholder wealth for
shareholders. Thus, issuers who opportunistically violate the implied bargain of
the refunding clause, at least in the eyes of investors, should also face an
erosion of investor confidence in relation to dividend payment, claim dilutions,
95 See supra text accompanying notes 6-16, relating the relevant events.
96 Kahan and Klausner, supra note 46, at 719-20.
97 1d. at 722-23.
98 To follow the Kahan and Klausner distinction between "learning benefits" and "network
benefits," id. at 726-27, one can term the benefits for issuers of later bonds as "learning benefits," while
the benefits to issuers who had refunding clauses already in their bonds can be labeled "network
benefits."
99 See supra Section I.B.
100 The author is indebted to Professor Jonathan R. Macey for suggesting this possibility.
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asset substitution, and underinvestment.1l Although these are areas that are
ripe for control through covenants to protect bondholders,' 0 2 it is not clear that
such legal control is actually effective. 10 3 Thus, the pricing benefit conferred by
investors upon issuers for such covenants may depend in part, even for
nominally legally enforceable covenants, on an issuer's reputation for treating
bondholders fairly. To the extent that an issuer is dependent on its reputation,
breaches of the refunding clause's implied guarantees would have additional
adverse impacts on the pricing of the issuer's debt.
Some commentators have been skeptical of the power of reputation in
repeat play scenarios to constrain the actions of issuers, especially in takeover
situations where managers are unlikely to need bond investors again., °4 The
setting of the refunding clause, however, suggests that the relevant context for
refunding clauses is indeed one of repeated bond issuances.10 5 The very nature
of the most egregious transgression, replacing high interest bonds with low
interest ones, itself involves bond issuances. It seems unlikely that an issuer
would seek to borrow today at a lower rate while anticipating never borrowing
again. Other commentators writing on redemption decisions have taken a more
positive view of the power of reputation in these markets.'0 6 Coffee and Klein
101 These are the four major areas identified by Smith and Warner for divergences between
shareholder and bondholder interests that necessitate bond covenants, to prevent shareholders from
failing to maximize value or taking bondholder wealth. Clifford W. Smith, Jr. & Jerold B. Warner, On
Financial Contracting: An Analysis of Bond Covenants, excerpted in FOUNDATIONS OF CORPORATE
LAW 127, 127 (Roberta Romano ed., 1993).
102 Id. at 128-33.
103 McDaniel, supra note 86 (arguing that far fewer covenant protections exist than are
perceived, and that effective legal protection must come in the form of fiduciary duties of directors to
bondholders); see also Bratton, supra note 86 (discussing conceptions of bondholder protections, and
arguing that existing law and legal theory could, but do not, protect bondholders against wealth transfers
from claim dilutions in restructurings).
104 McDaniel notes that "[w]hile market forces are an important constraint in normal
circumstances," takeover scenarios are more akin to a final period where, citing Telser, supra note 87,
managers are not constrained by self-enforcing agreements. McDaniel, supra note 86, at 434-35, 435
n. 112. Bratton similarly lacks confidence in reputation's power in these settings:
Corporate reputation-the unprotected bondholders' backstop-has proved ineffective.
Managers' and stockholders' incentives to maintain good reputations in the capital markets do
not have the staying power of contract promises; they shift along with power and money.
Exiting stockholders and managers care nothing about a corporate entity's future financing
costs. Managers battling to stay on might indeed care, but have more immediate problems.
Bratton, supra note 86, at 142. Wilson and Fabozzi are negative on the power of reputation in general,
and although they note that issuers must bear in mind relationships with the investment community
when considering redemptions, they caution that interest rates are an important driver and patterns of
previous issuer behavior are no guarantee against early redemptions. WILSON & FABOZZI, supra note 6,
at 216-17. Estimates of corporate reputations for delivering on promises seem to have gone down as
well. Spiotto, supra note 30, at *41.
105 None of the cases discussed here, where the plaintiffs alleged circumvention of refunding
clauses, arose in the context of the terminal phase of a corporation's life. Cf. Morgan Stanley & Co. v.
Archer Daniels Midland Co., 570 F. Supp. 1529 (S.D.N.Y. 1983); Franklin Life Ins. Co. v.
Commonwealth Edison Co., 451 F. Supp. 602 (S.D. I11. 1978), affdper curiam, 598 F.2d 1109 (7th Cir.
1979); cases cited supra note 26.
106 See Blanc & Gordon, supra note 30, at 334 (noting that issuer behavior may be
constrained by "business considerations such as the issuer's desire to sell bonds in the future"). King and
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suggest that market reputation mechanisms may constrain issuer behavior in the
coercive tender offer context, but consider it an expensive mechanism whose
cost is ultimately borne by companies at debt issuance. 0 7 They further suggest
that issuers may try to avoid this cost through covenants against coercive
offers, but cite ADM as an example of how covenants fail to evolve as needed,
suggesting that other issuers with refunding clauses "may have paid a price for
the opportunity" to act as ADM did-even though they had no such
intentions. °0 The reputation argument presented here disagrees with this notion
of a widespread reaction against all issuers utilizing refunding clauses. If the
key driver is defection from an implicit agreement, then only those companies
who act as ADM did, or evidence an intention to do so, should face penalties in
the pricing of their bonds. The implication that price effects would not be
widespread, but rather limited to companies based on their actions, is one way
to differentiate between this reputation hypothesis for the refunding clause and
the simpler discounting hypothesis given above.'0 9
The facts surrounding ADM, and some other cases where refunding
clauses were effectively circumvented, support this picture of a self-enforced
refunding clause, prohibiting calling bonds for market gains but permitting
calling bonds for non-market business reasons." 0 The presence of Rule 1 Ob-5
claims111 suggests that representations by issuers matter in these circumstances.
In ADM, notions of the company attempting to reap market gains appear to
have been present: Morgan Stanley alleged, it the court's words, that "ADM
intended to use the proceeds from the sale of the Debentures for speculation in
Mauer offer weak empirical evidence that investors react to issuer reputations, created by an issuer's
behavior the first time it calls a bond (for being "aggressive" or "not aggressive" bond callers); by the
second call, "aggressive" issuers tend to have their callable bonds trade at smaller premiums to call
prices compared to premiums on callable bonds of those who are "not aggressive." King & Mauer,
supra note 56, at 420, 421 fig.2.
107 Coffee & Klein, supra note 33, at 1253-54.
108 Id. at 1254 n.136.
109 See supra Section IIB; note 57 and accompanying text; see also infra text accompanying
notes 129-136 (discussing which explanation is more likely).
110 In ADM, the court noted that "[t]he market price at which ADM Debentures were trading
was no doubt more reflective of the investment community's perception of what ADM might do than it
was of what ADM had the legal right to do." Archer Daniels Midland, 570 F. Supp. at 1537 (S.D.N.Y.
1983). In Associated Builders, Inc. v. Alabama Power Co., 505 F.2d 97 (5th Cir. 1974), a court upheld
the use of a funnel sinking fund to redeem bonds at par before the refunding prohibition had passed. A
funnel sinking fund is where sinking fund requirements for all outstanding bonds are satisfied by
purchases of one issue. WILSON & FABOZZI, supra note 6, at 193-94. In Lucas v. Florida Power & Light
Co., 575 F. Supp. 552 (S.D. Fla. 1983), affd, 765 F.2d 1039 (1 1th Cir. 1985), an issuer's redemption of
bonds through a replacement fund, before refunding clause protection had expired, was upheld. In
Harris v. Union Electric Co., 622 S.W.2d 239 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981) a state court upheld the validity of
Union Electric's ultimately aborted plan, patterned on the FPL plan contested in Lucas, to refund bonds
before the expiration of refunding clause protection by redeeming them at par through the improvement
and maintenance funds. These cases are often mentioned together with ADM when commenting on par
bond calls, along with other possibilities for early redemptions, such as use of eminent domain clauses,
which go beyond the scope of this Note. See Blanc & Gordon, supra note 30, at 325-31; WILSON &
FABOZZI, supra note 6, at 174-217; see also Spiotto, supra note 30, at 23-33.
111 These were present in every case studied in this Note. See case citations supra note 39.
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long-term government securities in conjunction with a plan to call the
Debentures if and when interest rates dropped."' Although sales of new bonds
by Alabama Power in 1972 and 1973 seemed to face no investor wrath,"
13
despite its use of a sinking fund to redeem bonds before the end of refunding
protection, the company's parent did eventually have to make some of its
subsidiaries put restrictions on funnel sinking fund calls.
114
Florida Power & Light's use of their replacement fund to redeem bonds
115
also seemed to escape investor retaliation, 16 but this result is consistent with
the reputation explanation. The company executed its redemptions under
pressure from a public rate-setting commission, and furthermore, the purchase
of the bonds was not really a refunding. 117 The trial court specifically noted that
because the Public Service Commission's rate order was premised on
redemption, "[a]ll benefits resulting from the redemption were passed through
to the ratepayers .... FPL's shareholders did not receive any of the cost
savings.,118 Further, "FPL did not sell any bonds to redeem the 1078 bonds."
119
The company had commercial paper borrowings at the time of the redemption,
but "FPL had generated sufficient money through internal sources to have paid
off the commercial paper and was in a net invested position."'12 The Florida
Power & Light redemption was done for legitimate business purposes, and the
absence of negative consequences in this episode supports the reputation
explanation and its postulated division of benefits.
121
112 Archer Daniels Midland, 570 F. Supp. at 1533.
113 See Phil Hawkins, Prices Continue To Gain As 3 Issues Totaling $179 Million Sell Out,
WALL ST. J., Apr. 20, 1972, at 29; Byron Klapper, Price Gains of 2 Point Achieved by Seasoned
Corporates, Treasurys: Upswing Is Laid To Good Demand for 2 New Utility Offerings, High US.
Agency Debt Yields, WALL ST. J., Aug. 9, 1973, at 17; Southern Co. Unit Plans $120 Million Issue,
WALL ST. J., Mar. 14, 1972, at 39; Southern Co. Unit To Seek $795 Million, WALL ST. J., Mar. 8, 1972,
at 25.
114 See WILSON & FABOZZI, supra note 6, at 194. Alabama Power appears to have escaped
this prohibition on funnel sinking funds, as it did another such redemption in 1986. Laber, supra note
57, at 85.
115 For an empirical study of the pricing of bonds with M&R funds that provide special
redemption prices, see Laber, supra note 57.
116 Harris v. Union Elec. Co., 787 F.2d 355, 369 (8th Cir. 1986) ("Once UE observed that FP
& L's plan did not adversely affect its ability to re-enter the market, UE implemented its plan.").
117 Lucas v. Fla. Power & Light Co., 575 F. Supp. 552, 561-63, 565-66 (S.D. Fla. 1983).
118 Id. at 563 (emphasis added). This aspect of the redemption is also related in WILSON &
FABOZZI, supra note 6, at 199-200.
119 Lucas, 575 F. Supp. at 566.
120 Id. The trial court's findings of fact were strong enough to flatly state that "[t]he terms
,redemption' and 'refunding' are not synonymous.... The 1977 redemption was not a refunding." Id. at
565-66.
121 Although Florida Power & Light ultimately returned to the bond market without harm, the
announcement of its plan did draw severe criticism, Lucas v. Fla. Power & Light Co., 765 F.2d 1039,
1042-43 (11 th Cir. 1985); Richert, supra note 43. Note also that the cash used by the utility to make this
buyback seems to have been the result of curtailing construction. Id. This slowdown in construction may
have been due to reduced electric power demand, WILSON & FABOZZI, supra note 6, at 199, rather than
a function of the desire to reduce interest cost. The extent to which curtailing construction was, however,
a negative net present value decision for Florida Power & Light, and thus a poor business choice,
weakens the support this episode lends to the reputation hypothesis.
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In sharp contrast to FPL's intentions was the attempted Union Electric
redemption of $50 million in bonds via the replacement fund, where the
company announced that its plan was motivated by "'current relatively
attractive' bond rates" and that it would increase a planned bond -issue by fifty
million if the redemption was successful. 22 As a result of a bondholder lawsuit
in state court, "purchasers of the 9.35% bonds [which effectively would have
replaced the outstanding bonds that had the refunding clause] ... refused to
buy .... ,123 Despite prevailing on the indenture contract claims on appeal, 24
Union Electric had to cancel its planned bond sale, admitting that "the suit 'had
effectively prohibited the intended redemption and retirement of the 1 0 %
bonds."" 25 Union Electric was also the only case of those discussed here where
the plaintiff later prevailed on a federal lob-5 claim, winning a jury verdict in
the district court that was upheld upon appeal.'2 6 Indeed, the lob-5 litigation
revealed "evidence indicat[ing] that Mr. Grainger, one of UE's Advisory
Directors, vehemently opposed the plan as 'subordinating moral responsibility
for financial gain' and cautioned UE's president that the 'contract with the
Bondholders should be kept inviolate."" 27 In this instance, Union Electric
manifested a clear intention to let shareholders profit by taking interest rate-
driven gains away from bondholders, but the plan was stopped by a
combination of investor lawsuits and market reaction. 128 Consistent with an
extra-judicial reputation function for the refunding clause, investors succeeded
in defeating the refunding, even though legal enforcement of the refunding
clause itself could not directly do so.
The question remains as to whether the post-ADM value of the refunding
clause is primarily a function of the reputation hypothesis or the simpler
discounting hypothesis given above. 129 As suggested above, price effects may
help distinguish the two.' 30 If ADM led to an across the board drop in bond
prices, then it is likely that investors adjusted all prices to reflect the lower
probability of successful legal protection from the refunding clause. But if only
those bonds where issuers manifested an inclination to refund the bonds in "bad
122 Union Electric Plans To Redeem 10 ,% Issue at Special Price of 100, WALL ST. J., Apr.
12, 1978, at 47.
123 Harris v. Union Elec. Co., 787 F.2d 355, 360 (8th Cir. 1986).
124 Harris v. Union Elec. Co., 622 S.W.2d 239 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981).
125 Union Electric Drops Redemption Proposal, Citing Court Challenge, WALL ST. J., June
20, 1978, at 35 (quoting a company press release).
126 Harris, 787 F.2d at 359.
127 Id. at 369.
128 The Harris plaintiffs actually continued to litigate after the conclusion of the federal lOb-
5 suit by returning to state court for injunctive relief, an ultimately unsuccessful attempt ended by an
adverse decision of the Missouri Supreme Court. Harris v. Union Elec. Co., 766 S.W.2d 80 (Mo. 1989).
This "apparently unending litigation" seems to have finally concluded in 1991 with a decision by the
Missouri Court of Appeals against allowing further claims by the plaintiffs on the basis of these same
facts. Harris v. Union Elec. Co., 817 S.W.2d 591, 591-92 (Mo. Ct. App. 1991).
129 See supra Section lI.B.
130 See supra notes 57, 108-109 and accompanying text.
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faith" showed price effects, then the reputation explanation is more likely.
Anecdotally, the reputation explanation is favored. The Wall Street Journal's
coverage of Florida Power & Light's innovative redemption noted that
utility officials surveyed indicated they fear a 'backlash' from investors should
they choose to retire bonds early at the special redemption price. Most
managements who have the option say they believe it is contrary to the original
intent of the provisions, a 'breach of confidence,' in the words of one.t
3 1
The same article also reported on other issuers who had both the cash flow
and indentures necessary to retire their bonds similarly-while the article noted
that Florida Power & Light bond prices were falling, it was silent as to whether
the bonds of the other given issuers were suffering the same market impact.'
3 2
This seems especially salient, given that one of the named issuers, Carolina
Power & Light Company, 133 did indeed redeem its bonds through the
replacement and maintenance fund soon after-bonds which were trading
above the redemption price at the time of call.134 There seem to be no reports of
widespread, cross-issuer price effects, but there continued to be examples of
price drops following redemption announcements. 135 Without a solid pricing
study 136 that is beyond the scope of this Note, it is hard to tell which
explanation is prevalent, but anecdotal evidence points to the reputation
explanation.
III. Suggestions for Future Research: Initial Empirical Observations
This Part makes some initial empirical observations with the goal of
illuminating directions for future empirical investigation. The observations
presented here run to the limited purpose of seeing whether conditions exist, on
both the investor and issuer sides of the bond market, that are consistent with
the reputation explanation presented above.
131 Richert, supra note 43. Wilson and Fabozzi also note that "some companies may be
reluctant to utilize an M&R call for fear of angering their investors" but caution that regulators may give
the companies no choice. WILSON & FABOZZI, supra note 6, at 199.
132 Richert, supra note 43.
133 Id.
134 Laber, supra note 57, at 83; WILSON & FABOZZI, supra note 6, at 200. Carolina Power &
Light was also unsuccessfully sued by bondholders. Id; see also Laber, supra note 57, at 83.
135 The examples are Houston Lighting & Power Company's 1986 par redemption of some
its 12.375% first mortgage bonds due 2013, and Central Maine Power Company's 1988 par redemption
of some of its 12.25% General and Refunding Mortgage Bonds due 2013. WILSON & FABOZZI, supra
note 6, at 200-01. Wilson and Fabozzi attribute the price drop in the Central Maine episode to reported
investor ignorance about the specifics of Central Maine's outstanding debt. Id. Laber also gives
examples of bonds trading at a premium just before redemptions at lower prices through maintenance
and replacement funds. Laber, supra note 57, at 83-84.
136 For existing pricing studies and accompanying discussion, see supra notes 34, 44, 57.
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A. Investors
For investors to enforce any breaches of the division of benefits implied
by the refunding clause, there must be bondholders sophisticated enough to
understand the nuances of the clause, stable enough to be repeat buyers over
time, and large enough to exact future price punishment upon defecting issuers.
Status as an institutional investor is one convenient proxy for the first two
requirements. As professionals, one would expect institutions to be as
sophisticated as investors get. Given the levels of market and business acumen
necessary to appraise bond investments, they should be able to assess whether
an issuer's decision to call bonds before the end of refunding protection is due
to business reasons or to a desire to capitalize on market moves. Institutional
investors are also likely to be a much more permanent presence in bond
markets than retail investors.137 Thus institutional investors' market share, as a
proxy for the third requirement of having sufficient size to retaliate against
wayward issuers, can be an initial indicator of whether the investor side of the
bond market could play the required role in a self-enforced, reputational view
of the refunding clause.
138
A ready source of data on bond purchasers in the U.S. market is the
Federal Reserve's historical annual Z. 1 releases, the Flow of Funds Accounts of
the United States,139 which give in flow table F.212 each year's bond issuances
and purchases, broken down by categories of issuers and purchasers.140 These
statistics are broader than the type of bonds contemplated in this Note,
137 Life insurance companies and pension funds, which by their very nature must take long-
term perspectives, are included here under the grouping of institutional investors.
138 For a caveat to this view, see Brudney, supra note 5, at 1854 n.99 (noting that institutional
investors are better, relative to individuals, in dealing with issuers, but collective action is still unlikely,
especially in refundings).
139 Publications covering the period from 1955 to 2003 were used. These were: BD. OF
GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., FLOW OF FUNDS ACCOUNTS OF THE UNITED STATES: ANNUAL
FLOWS AND OUTSTANDINGS 1955-1964, at 36 (2004), available at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/zl/20040304/annuals/a1955-1964.pdf, BD. OF GOVERNORS OF
THE FED. RESERVE Sys., FLOW OF FUNDS ACCOUNTS OF THE UNITED STATES: ANNUAL FLOWS AND
OuTSTANDINGS 1965-1974, at 36 (2004), available at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/zl/20040304/annuals/a1965-1974.pdf; BD. OF GOVERNORS OF
THE FED. RESERVE Sys., FLOW OF FUNDS ACCOUNTS OF THE UNITED STATES: ANNUAL FLOWS AND
OUTSTANDINGS 1975-1984, at 36 (2004), available at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/zl/20040304/annuals/al975-1984.pdf; BD. OF GOVERNORS OF
THE FED. RESERVE SYS., FLOW OF FUNDS ACCOUNTS OF THE UNITED STATES: ANNUAL FLOWS AND
OUTSTANDINGS 1985-1994, at 36 (2004), available at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/zl/20040304/annuals/a1985-1994.pdf; BD. OF GOVERNORS OF
THE FED. RESERVE SYS., FLOW OF FUNDS ACCOUNTS OF THE UNITED STATES: ANNUAL FLOWS AND
OUTSTANDINGS 1995-2003, at 36 (2004), available at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/zl/20040304/annuals/al995-2003.pdf.
140 For a detailed explanation of the table construction, see BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED.
RESERVE Sys., GUIDE TO THE FLOW OF FUNDS ACCOUNTS 500-13 (1993). The author acknowledges
that this descriptive manual is older than the data series employed here, and that there have been some
changes in data construction, but remains confident that the information in the 1993 manual is
sufficiently accurate for the current purposes of general observation.
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encompassing securities such as convertibles and asset-backed debt,14 but
should suffice for the current purpose, since there is little reason to believe that
purchaser characteristics for the bond market overall should differ vastly from
the purchaser characteristics of interest here. Also, it should be noted that this
data reflects net purchases of new issues and outstanding issues. 
142
Tables 1A to 1C give the percentages of bond purchases made by non-
institutional versus institutional investors. 143 To match the time spanned by the
issue dates in the bond sample discussed below, 144 these tables cover 1961
through 1992.145 Because the Federal Reserve data do not break down foreign
purchasers into subunits that can be classified as either institutional or non-
institutional, all foreign purchases are considered non-institutional in Tables 1A
to 1C. 14' Tables 2A to 2C give the non-institutional/institutional breakdown
excluding foreign purchases.147 Table 3 summarizes the relative market shares
over time, including foreign purchases. Table 4 does the same, excluding
foreign purchases.
The relative market shares of non-institutional to institutional investors
fluctuate over this period, but it is clear from Tables IA to IC and 2A to 2C
that institutional investors always constitute a substantial proportion of the
market. As indicated by negative numbers in Tables 1 through 4, in some years
non-institutional investors are actually net sellers of bonds-but this is never
true of institutional investors. In their lowest year, as shown by Tables 3 and 4,
institutional investors still comprised over 40% of the market; on average over
this period, institutional investors constituted about 80% of bond buyers. Given
their continuous and large presence, it seems plausible that the bond purchasing
market includes enough institutional bond investors to be consistent with the
reputation hypothesis that these investors could retaliate against defecting
issuers.
141 Id.
142 The cleanest examination would be to look only at purchasers of new issues, since
retaliation against issuers would have to take place in the pricing of bonds at issuance. It is possible to
get net purchase results such as those presented below, see infra text accompanying notes 143-147, but
still not have new issue conditions that are consistent with the reputation explanation, if households
purchased most new issues and institutions did the bulk of their buying in secondary transactions with
households. This scenario, however, seems fairly implausible, and there is little reason to believe that
the purchasers of bonds generally should be drastically different from the purchasers of new issues.
143 For the division between non-institutional and institutional, see infra notes b-d,
accompanying Tables 1A to 1C.
144 See infra Section II1.B.
145 2003 is also included simply for reference.
146 See sources cited supra notes 139-140.
147 The percentages in Tables 2A to 2C are the same as those which would result from the
assumption that foreign bond purchases have the same non-institutional/institutional division as
American purchases.
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Table 3: Summary Statistics for Percentages of Net Bond Purchases, Non-
Institutional (Including Foreign Purchases), versus Institutional Investors,
1961-1992 a
Minimum Maximum Average
Non-Institutional bd -18.5% 56.9% 20.7%
Institutional c, d 43.0% 118.5% 79.1%
Since the horizon of the analysis is only 1961 to 1992, to be consistent with infra Section IlI.B,
minimums, maximums, and averages are calculated only for that period. The percentages for 2003,
although listed in Table 1C for comparative purposes, are not included in these calculations.
t Non-institutional includes those Federal Reserve sectors listed under non-institutional below the
heading "Breakdown" in Tables IA to IC. Bank personal trusts and estates are listed here because it is
unclear whether these are professionally managed; exchange traded funds are listed here because most
such funds are passively managed.
' Institutional includes those Federal Reserve sectors listed under institutional below the heading
"Breakdown" in Tables IA to 1C.
d Sectors listed under non-institutional and institutional in Tables 1A to IC are those used by the
Federal Reserve. The non-institutional/institational division is the author's own.
Source: Federal Reserve Z.1 releases, see supra note 139, and author's own calculations, see text.
Table 4: Summary Statistics for Percentages of Net Bond Purchases, Non-
Institutional (Excluding Foreign Purchases), versus Institutional Investors,
1961-1992 a
Minimum Maximum Average
Non-Institutional b,d -50.4% 55.2% 12.9%
Institutional c,d 44.7% 149.6% 86.9%
aSince the horizon of the analysis is only 1961 to 1992, to be consistent with infra Section I1.B,
minimums, maximums, and averages are calculated only for that period. The percentages for 2003,
although listed in Table 2C for comparative purposes, are not included in these calculations.
b Non-institutional includes those Federal Reserve sectors listed under non-institutional below the
heading "Breakdown" in Tables 2A to 2C. Bank personal trusts and estates are listed here because it is
unclear whether these are professionally managed; exchange traded funds are listed here because most
such funds are passively managed.
Institutional includes those Federal Reserve sectors listed under institutional below the heading
"Breakdown" in Tables 2A to 2C.
d Sectors listed under non-institutional and institutional in Tables 2A to 2C are those used by the
Federal Reserve. The non-institutional/institutional division is the author's own.
Source: Federal Reserve Z.I releases, see supra note 139, and author's own calculations, see text.
Clearly, more empirical work remains before any pronouncement on the
reputation hypothesis, as far as investors are concerned, can be made. This
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initial set of observations reveals that it could be fruitful to delve deeper into
the composition of the pool of institutional investors. Are there particular
institutional investors that in fact denominate the group such that there are
perhaps a few institutions which might have enough clout to punish an issuer
alone? Or is the buying power of institutions more evenly spread so that some
level of implicit cooperation would be required before an issuer would feel the
price impact? Empirical estimates of how the buying behavior of one institution
impacts another would also be useful in further evaluating this hypothesis-is it
possible that one disgruntled investor might take the lead in initiating
retaliation? Such finer exploration of the investor side of the market could be
productively paired with a more rigorous model of a reputation and retaliation
mechanism, which might assist in divining boundaries on or estimates of how
much investor pressure might constitute "enough." Nevertheless, this
preliminary analysis of the composition of bond market investors suggests that
the reputation hypothesis is empirically possible.
B. Issuers
An initial step in exploring whether issuer behavior is consistent with the
reputational explanation of the refunding clause is to examine whether issuers
found the clause valuable enough to continue using after ADM greatly
weakened the clause's legal value in August 1983. A first look at the timing of
issuers' use of the clause is taken here.
Thirty companies were randomly chosen from the Moody's Industrial
Manual for 1982.148 Foreign companies and companies not covered in the
Moody's Industrial Manual were excluded. Cross-references, for all
information or for debt information, were traced until a Moody's report was
located; if subsidiary debt was reported with the parent, the parent company
was included. 149 This meant that bigger companies, with more listed entities,
were more likely to be chosen. Using the Moody's Industrial Manuals for 1982
and 1992,150 data on bond covenants were collected for all of the reported
148 MOODY'S INVESTORS SERV., MOODY'S INDUSTRIAL MANUAL 1982 (1982) [hereinafter
MOODY'S 1982]. This is the first version in which the disputed ADM bonds appear in the regular
section; the summary of the refunding protection for the ADM 16% debentures appears with the other
ADM information, 1 MOODY'S 1982, supra, at 2572, rather than in the addenda as occurred in the
previous edition, 1 MOODY'S INVESTORS SERV., MOODY'S INDUSTRIAL MANUAL 1981, at 3064 (1981).
The selection process was based on using random numbers to choose companies from the table of
contents. Fifteen companies were selected from each volume, (volume 1 covers names starting with A
through I; volume 2 covers J to Z). A random number generator was used to pick a page on the table of
contents of the manual, and another random number was used to pick a company from the entries on that
page. Random selections of excluded companies, such as foreign companies, were disregarded and
replaced with another random draw. The one instance where a previously selected company was picked
a second time was treated the same way.
149 In this way, the selection of Marathon Oil led to the inclusion of U.S. Steel's bonds, while
the choice of the Sunbeam Corporation led to the inclusion of all of the debt of Allegheny International.
150 MOODY'S 1982, supra note 148; MOODY'S 1992, supra note 35.
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bonds of each of the thirty companies at these two points in time. Only eighteen
of the companies had survived to 1992.151 The depth of Moody's coverage
varies; all bonds that were described in sufficient detail, such that it was
possible to discern whether the debt indenture contained a refunding covenant,
were included.1 52 Debt of all seniorities was included, as was subsidiary debt if
it was reported with the parent. Although often described sufficiently,
convertible securities and preferred stock were excluded.1
53
The final survey covered 123 bonds. 54 Because outstanding bonds
continue to be reported in later Moody's manuals, the earliest issue date was in
1961. The latest was in 1992. A result of Moody's varying treatment depth is
that only fifteen of the thirty companies have bonds in this set of 123, and the
represented fifteen tend to be companies with large market capitalizations.
1 55
Table 5 lists the thirty companies, ordered by 1981 market capitalization,
indicating how many bonds from each issuer are surveyed. Table 5 makes clear
that, despite the random selection of the companies, depending on Moody's for
details tilted the survey heavily towards the bonds of larger companies. 1
56
151 MOODY'S 1992, supra note 35. Debt of companies that merged into other companies,
went out of business, went private, or simply could not be found in the MOODY'S 1992, was not further
investigated for inclusion in the data set. For details regarding each of the twelve companies that were
not found in MOODY'S 1992, see infra notes-accompanying Table 5.
152 From the Moody's description of the ADM 16% debentures' call and refunding
protection, 1 MOODY'S 1982, supra note 148, at 2572, it is clear what level of detail is necessary to
make this determination. In total, 350 different securities were noted, with 164 of them being described
in sufficient detail to be usable. This group was then further reduced by excluding certain types of
securities, see infra note 153 and accompanying text.
153 This resulted in dropping eleven sufficiently described convertible bonds, fifteen
convertible preferred stocks, and fourteen regular preferred stocks. Although the preferred stocks were
often described in enough detail to determine call provisions and terms, they seldom had issue dates.
154 After removing convertible and preferred securities, 124 bonds remained, one of which
had to be dropped due to data entry problems.
155 The Moody's Industrial Manual gives each company's high and low stock price for the
previous year, as well as shares outstanding (but not all figures are as of the same dates, either within a
company or across companies). Market capitalization here means the average of the high and low
market capitalization figures as computed from this information in MOODY'S 1982, supra note 148,
which gives stock data for the previous year, 1981.
156 To the extent that larger companies tend to issue debt more frequently and are likely to
survive for longer, as is suggested by Table 5, this bias might be expected to result, if the reputation
hypothesis is correct, in more uses of the refunding clause being found within this sample than among
bond issuers in general.
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' See supra note 155 for an explanation of these numbers.
b Merged into Holiday Corp., and in 1990 merged into Bass PLC. I MOODY'S INVESTORS SERV.,
MOODY'S INDUSTRIAL MANUAL 1990 (1990) [hereinafter MOODY'S 1990] (listing changes in
"Additional Companies Formerly Included" section).
' Merged into an Aetna Life & Casualty Co. subsidiary in 1982. 1 MOODY'S INVESTORS SERV.,
MOODY'S INDUSTRIAL MANUAL 1983 (1983) (listing change in "Additional Companies Formerly
Included" section).
Merged into Japonica Partners subsidiary Sunbeam-Oster Company, Inc., in 1990. 1 MOODY'S
INVESTORS SERV., MOODY'S INDUSTRIAL MANUAL 1991 (1991) [hereinafter MOODY'S 1991] (listing
change in "Additional Companies Formerly Included" section).
' Merged with Maxwell Communications in 1988. 2 MOODY'S INVESTORS SERV., MOODY'S
INDUSTRIAL MANUAL 1989 (1989) [hereinafter MOODY'S 1989] (listing change in "Additional
Companies Formerly Included" section).
f Changed name to VBQ, Inc. and became private. Id. (listing change in "Additional Companies
Formerly Included" section).
Disappears from Moody's without explanation between 1990 and 1991. Compare 1 MOODY'S
1990, supra note b, at 2775-77 (reporting on Commonwealth Oil Refining Co., Inc.), with 1 MOODY'S
1991, supra note d (not mentioning Commonwealth Oil Refining Co., Inc.).
" Merged in 1986 with Service Corp. Intl. 1 MOODY'S INVESTORS SERV., MOODY'S INDUSTRIAL
MANUAL 1987 (1987) [hereinafter MOODY'S 1987] (listing change in "Additional Companies Formerly
Included" section).
'Disappears from Moody's without explanation between 1988 and 1989. Compare I MOODY'S
INVESTORS SERV., MOODY'S INDUSTRIAL MANUAL 1988 (1988), at 2575-76 (reporting on APL Corp.),
with 1 MOODY'S 1989, supra note e, (not mentioning APL Corp.).
i Changed name to National Enterprises, Inc. in 1986, 1 MOODY'S INVESTORS SERV., MOODY'S
INDUSTRIAL MANUAL 1986 (1986) [hereinafter MOODY'S 1986] (listing change in "Additional
Companies Formerly Included" section), which filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy in 1990, 2 MOODY'S
1991, supra note d, at 5987.
Disappears from Moody's for lack of new information, between 1985 and 1986, MOODY'S
1986, supra note j (listing change in "Additional Companies Formerly Included" section).
1 Merged with an EDO Corp. subsidiary in 1987. 1 MOODY'S 1987, supra note h (listing change
in "Additional Companies Formerly Included" section).
' Disappears from Moody's without explanation between 1990 and 1991. Compare I MOODY'S
1990, supra note b, at 3095-96 (reporting on Homasote Co.), with 1 MOODY'S 1991, supra note d (not
mentioning Homasote Co.).
Source: MOODY'S 1982, supra note 148; MOODY'S 1992, supra note 35; author's calculations,
see text.
Special attention was paid to each bond's call, sinking fund, and refunding
protection characteristics. Using as a template the summary language on the
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ADM 16% debentures, 157 other bonds with similar summaries were counted as
having the same provision. Assuming this connection between the summaries
and indenture language seems reasonable. The ADM refunding clause was a
boilerplate provision, 158 making it likely that other bonds would use the same
language-and there is no reason why Moody's would not summarize the same
terms in the same way. Additionally, this notion that the same type of summary
indicates the same type of refunding protection is bolstered by examples where
the summaries changed to note additional features. 159 Finally, it is important to
note that these summaries did not change after the ADM decision. One would
expect that if any of the suggested changes to the refunding clause had been
implemented, making a substantial change to the clause, Moody's would have
altered its summaries to reflect this.'
60
The 123 bonds were separated into two groups based on whether they
were issued before or after the August 19, 1983 ADM decision. Within each
group, the number of callable bonds without refunding clauses, and the number
of callable bonds with them, were counted. These two groups of callable bonds
were further parsed for the number of bonds with sinking fund provisions. For
bonds that were callable, had a refunding prohibition for some period, and also
had a sinking fund, the sinking fund terms were explored to see if they were
"consistent" with the terms of the refunding clause.' 6 1 Non-callable bonds were
157 Moody's summarized the ADM refunding clause by giving the bond's call schedule,
followed by: "Also callable for sinking fund (which see) at 100. Not callable, however, prior to May 15,
1991 thru refunding at an interest cost of less than 16.08% per annum." 1 MOODY'S 1982, supra note
148, at 2572.
158 Morgan Stanley & Co. v. Archer Daniels Midland Co., 570 F. Supp. 1529, 1535
(S.D.N.Y. 1983) (noting that the ADM refunding protection language was "apparently taken verbatim"
from model indenture provisions).
159 For instance, the summary of U.S. Steel's Texas Oil & Gas Corp. 11.5% debentures due
November 2002 includes the standard refunding prohibition language, but also includes the proviso that
an officers' certificate is sufficient evidence that any bond calls are not a part of a prohibited refunding.
2 MOODY'S 1992, supra note 35, at 6462. Another example is Valero Energy Corp.'s Coastal States Gas
Producing Co., 7.75% Series E bonds due 1991; after the usual language on refunding prohibitions, the
summary adds that redemptions as a result of eminent domain actions would be done at par. 2 MOODY'S
1982, supra note 148, at 4593. For more on redemptions relating to eminent domain, see Blanc &
Gordon, supra note 30, at 323, 329. A few other bonds' summaries also explicitly noted restrictions on
redeeming the bonds through sale and leaseback transactions. Because neither the eminent domain nor
officers' certificate information seem to reduce the issuer's ability to redeem bonds within the refunding
call protection period, both of those bonds were counted as instances of ADM-like refunding clauses.
Since the ADM provision itself included a sale and leaseback condition, Archer Daniels Midland, 570 F.
Supp. at 1535, the bonds where those conditions were listed explicitly were also counted as examples of
standard, ADM-like refunding clauses.
160 See supra text accompanying notes 31-32 for the suggested improvements of Fisher and
Greenfield. No hint of any such change is given in any of the Moody's summaries of refunding
protection, suggesting that it is much more likely that the summarized bonds had provisions like the one
found in the ADM 16% debentures rather than incorporating the suggested improvements.
161 A sinking fund was "consistent" with a refunding clause if sinking fund payments were
scheduled to begin only after the refunding prohibition had passed. If the sinking fund allowed some of
the bonds to be called before the refunding clause's term expired, so that the clause's prohibition against
early retirement would not protect bondholders against some early redemptions for the sinking fund, the
sinking fund provision was "inconsistent."
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also tallied and sub-divided based on the existence or lack of a sinking fund.
Table 6 provides these counts, with all breakdowns also computed as
percentages of the total number of bonds in the set for that time period.
Table 6 shows that, in this survey, use of the refunding clause fell steeply
after ADM in 1983; refunding clauses were found in approximately 30% of the
pre-ADM sample, but only in about 4% of the post-ADM sample.' 62 This
observation does not support the reputation explanation, but does not
necessarily disprove the hypothesis either. Table 6 also illustrates a massive
drop in issuers' use of callable bonds without the refunding clause, which made
up approximately 70% of the pre-ADM sample but only about 21% of the post-
ADM sample. In the later data, non-callable debt makes large gains, leaping
from zero observations in the pre-ADM data to composing 75% of the post-
ADM bonds.163 At the same time, this survey suggests that sinking funds fell
into disfavor: A total of just over 82% of the pre-ADM bonds had sinking
funds, 164 while only about 4% of the post-ADM bonds did. 165 All of these
changes suggest that more factors, beyond just the legal decision in ADM, were
shifting during this time; future research could productively tease out these
different strands.
162 Note that this observation creates a tension with the Coffee and Klein suggestion cited
above, supra note 33, that "investors like Morgan Stanley continued to accept the same language in
obligations issued after the [ADM] decision." Coffee & Klein, supra note 33, at 1254 n.136.
163 This decreased popularity of callable debt in more recent times accords with Kish's
observation of relatively fewer bonds with calls in the 1987-1996 period, as opposed to the 1977-1986
period. Kish, supra note 34, at 83 n.8.
164 The pre-ADM estimate here accords with Smith and Warner's report that 82% of public
bond issues in the years 1963 to 1965 had sinking funds. Smith & Warner, supra note 101, at 131.
165 The observations here on sinking funds do not line up perfectly with Allen, Lamy, and
Thompson's characterizations of their data on the presence of sinking funds relative to call protection
and refunding protection. See Allen et al., supra note 34, at 40, 41 & Exhibit 2. This may be due to
differences in data set size or time covered.
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Table 6: Breakdowns of Provisions in the Surveyed Bonds
Number Percentage of Bonds
Set and Subset Description a of Bonds Issued in the Time Period
Issued Before ADM 67 100.0%
(Before August 19, 1983)
Callable, Without Refunding Clauses 47 70.1%
With Sinking Fund 35 52.2%
Without Sinking Fund 12 17.9%
Callable, With Refunding Clauses 20 29.9%
With Sinking Fund 20 29.9%
Consistent Sinking Fund 12 17.9%
Inconsistent Sinking Fund 8 11.9%
Without Sinking Fund 0 0.0%
Non-Callable 0 0.0%
With Sinking Fund 0 0.0%
Without Sinking Fund 0 0.0%
Issued After ADM 56 100.0%
(After August 19, 1983)
Callable, Without Refunding Clauses 12 21.4%
With Sinking Fund 1 1.8%
Without Sinking Fund 11 19.6%
Callable, With Refunding Clauses 2 3.6%
With Sinking Fund 1 1.8%
Consistent Sinking Fund 1 1.8%
Inconsistent Sinking Fund 0 0.0%
Without Sinking Fund 1 1.8%
Non-Callable 42 75.0%
With Sinking Fund 0 0.0%
Without Sinking Fund 42 b 75.0%
TOTAL NUMBER OF BONDS: 123
a For explanations of these sets and subsets, see text.
b This count includes two bonds for which no sinking fund information is provided.
Source: MOODY'S 1982, supra note 148; MOODY'S 1992, supra note 35; author's own
calculations.
One major factor that could have swamped the impact of the ADM
decision is the change in interest rates that took place over this period. The
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current observations are insufficient for an analysis of interest rate impacts,
166
but some intuition can be gleaned from the overall trend in interest rates, as
seen in the Federal Reserve's H. 15 historical interest rate release data on 10-
year treasury rates, interest rates for corporate bonds rated Aaa by Moody's,
and interest rates for Baa-rated corporate debt. 167 Figure 1 charts these three
Federal Reserve data series from 1961 through 1992. As Figure 1 shows, the
late 1970s were a time of historically high interest rates, and ADM was decided
as rates were dropping sharply. As the cost of attaching a call generally
decreases with lower interest rates, 168 the value of calls in new issues may very
well have been falling over the post-ADM period.1 69 The lower value of calls
may have led managers to seek fewer calls in new issues, or when they did, the
fact that the calls were becoming cheaper relative to the late 1970s might have
led managers to be less concerned with cost containment measures such as
refunding prohibitions.
166 The number of bonds is too small, given the dispersion of the bonds over issuance times
and maturities, not to mention differences in industry and credit factors, to conduct any meaningful
analysis.
167 Federal Reserve Statistical Release, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System,
H. 15 Selected Interest Rates, Historical Data, http://www.federalreserve.gov/Releases/h I5/data.htm (last
visited May 24, 2004). Figure 1 uses the monthly frequency of the Treasury constant maturities,
nominal, 10-year series, and the Moody's seasoned Aaa and Baa series. While it is unclear from the
Federal Reserve release what treasury benchmark the corporate series are built on top of, Figure 1
suggests that use of the 10-year Treasury rate for comparison is reasonable. Note, however, that
subtracting the 10-year Treasury rate from the Aaa series results in seven observations of negative
spreads (out of a total of 384 observations used here).
168 See Kish, supra note 34, at 78, 83 n.3. Note that call valuation can, however, become
complicated.
169 Given that the decision to exercise a call is related to the remaining value retained when
not exercising the option, King and Mauer's evidence of "an explosion of call activity in the 1986-94
period" that "coincided with a sharp decrease in interest rates in 1986," and the inverse relationships
they find between number of calls and interest rates, as well as the number of calls and yield volatility,
King & Mauer, supra note 56, at 407, 408 & tbl. 1, 409 fig. 1, all suggest that the values of bond calls as
open options were falling in the late 1980s. Others have noted the fall in value of call protection, as
opposed to refunding protection, after 1986. See WILSON & FABOZZI, supra note 6, at 182.
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Figure 1: 10-Year Treasury Rates, Aaa Corporate Bond Rates, and
Baa Corporate Bond Rates, 1961-1992a











aData frequency is monthly. See supra note 167 for explanation of data series.
Source: Federal Reserve Statistical Release, supra note 167.
Besides the fall in interest rates, it may also be that other possibilities
came about which made the self-enforced, reputation-driven refunding clause
less appealing in comparison. 70 Perhaps the decrease in sinking funds is related
to the increase in non-callable debt. Maybe issuers were willing to give up
some flexibility (being unable to call debt) to gain other flexibility by freeing
up cash that would otherwise have been locked up in sinking funds.
Meanwhile, investors might be willing to gain protection against issuer calls
that take bond market gains, at the risk of allowing increased issuer
appropriations of bondholder wealth by other means. 1 71 This particular
suggested trade-off may be too simple, 172 and some empirical evidence seems
170 The emergence of make-whole calls is not a viable explanation for the drop off in use of
the refunding clause, as make-whole calls were not introduced into the public market until over a decade
later. Mann & Powers, supra note 72, at 535.
171 One possible way that sinking funds help bondholders is to rein in the costs of dividend
constraints--since dividend constraints push companies to invest rather than pay out dividends, they can
create pressure to invest in unprofitable projects; sinking funds create an outlet for payments that
reduces the odds of dividend constraints forcing such poor investment choices. Smith & Warner, supra
note 101, at 13 1. Smith and Warner also give other possible benefits of sinking funds as well. Id.
172 See Kish, supra note 34, at 81 (discussing how sinking funds have conflicting factors,
some of which benefit investors while others work against them).
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to be to the contrary.' 73 Nevertheless, the observation remains that the use of
calls and the use of sinking funds both appear to have changed drastically
during this period, and these changes, conceivably paired with other factors not
observed in the current survey, may have evolved to solve the problem
originally targeted by the refunding clause. This alternative may have
competitively edged out the refunding clause even if the posited reputation
mechanism existed. This could be the case if the refunding clause's efficacy
had been supported by the tandem of the reputation mechanism together with
some probability of legal enforceability, and-once ADM reduced the
probability of legal success-the reputation mechanism was simply not
powerful enough when standing alone.
These initial empirical observations help to focus future research by
suggesting a number of avenues to explore.' 74 Future inquiries on the issuer
side of the market should not rely only on the survey approach taken in this
Note's preliminary investigations. Rather, future studies should focus on
isolating those companies that did continue to use the refunding clause,' 75 and
examining the circumstances surrounding their employment of the provision-
were these companies frequent issuers, and what interest rates were attached to
those bonds? Were the companies that continued to use the clause centered in
any specific industries which might have peculiar characteristics?176 As noted
above, 177 interest rates were likely to have been an important driver of changes
in bond covenants during this particular time, so empirical study of the impact
of falling rates on the value of calls could be beneficial in shedding light on that
alternative explanation for the decrease in use of refunding protection. 178
Furthermore, such a study might consider how the general decrease in interest
173 Kish's regression estimates suggest that the existence of a sinking fund increases bond
yields, just as a call does. Id. at 82, 87 tbl.2. This would suggest that removing calls and sinking funds
both work in favor of investors, and thus would not arise as a bargain where both the issuer and investor
are compromising. However, Kish's sinking fund estimates are mostly statistically insignificant. Id.
174 Another mystery, aside from the topic of this Note, is reconciling the work linking agency
costs to callable debt, see Bodie & Taggart, Investment Opportunities, supra note 63; Barnea et al.,
supra note 65; Thatcher, supra note 61, with the observed drop in callable debt issuance. If bond calls
are tied to agency costs, then the observations here of the lessened use of callable bonds require an
explanation of some sort of change in agency costs over this time.
175 Of the thirty companies surveyed here, those companies were North American Coal Corp.
(which used a refunding clause in its 12.375% senior subordinated debentures of Hyster-Yale Materials
Handling, Inc., issued in 1989) and Atlantic Richfield Company (which used the clause in its 9.35%
ARCO Chemical bonds issued in 1989). In addition, the companies listed in the Appendix continued to
use refunding clauses.
176 The average length of refunding restrictions on the bonds in Kish's 1980-1986 dataset was
roughly the same across the industrial, financial, and utility sectors. Kish, supra note 34, at 79. This may
suggest that there was not great sector variation in use of the refunding clause; however, note that Kish's
sample only extended to 1986 and thus does not cover a large part of the period in question here. More
importantly, even if different sectors provided protection for the same amount of time on average, this
still does not imply that the frequency or distribution of use by each sector was the same.
177 See supra text accompanying notes 166-169.
178 This would also help illuminate the causes behind the observed drop in use of callable
bonds generally.
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rates was spread over industries, and if there was any relationship between this
and the types of companies that continued to use refunding clauses. A pricing
study might also distinguish between the discounting hypothesis and the
reputation hypothesis by revealing whether price impacts were widespread or
issuer-specific. 179 Finally, in-depth empirical study of other developments in
bond structuring would be useful to determine whether other means evolved to
supplant the refunding clause in policing the division of benefits between
bondholders and shareholders.
IV. Conclusion
Surprising the markets with publicly available information is an event that
itself is surprising. Yet on the surface, that was apparently what occurred when
ADM called its 16% debentures in 1983, eight years before the expiration of
refunding protection. The resulting drop in bond prices triggered a lawsuit
against ADM by the large, sophisticated investment bank Morgan Stanley.
ADM prevailed, a legal result which was not shocking given an existing
precedent. Also, there had been other cases where issuers had been allowed to
retire bonds at special prices despite the presence of refunding clauses. It is
particularly curious that the ADM litigation arose at all, and that some bonds
continued to have refunding clauses even after ADM was decided.
This Note articulates a number of reasons that explain the ADM episode.
One possibility is that bond indentures are simply irrelevant for investors, being
either ignored or the victim of a rational decision to focus resources on issues
other than understanding legal details. Two other possibilities exist that conflict
less with notions of efficient capital markets and ascribe more rationality to the
market's behavior. First, investors could have internalized the information
about refunding clauses' legal weaknesses to reassess the prohibitions' total
value, discounting the value of the measures accordingly. The value of the
provision would not be zero after the Franklin precedent, or even after ADM,
and thus the credit offered by some rational investors might still lead certain
issuers to include refunding clauses. Second, the refunding clause might be a
division of benefits that is too fine for legal policing, but is enforced by extra-
judicial, reputational means. The clause may be a signal by issuers that they
might call their bonds for legitimate business reasons, but will not do so only to
take gains from interest rate movements away from bondholders. Investors
credit issuers for this pledge with lower yields at issuance. Issuer defections
result in erosion of an issuer's overall reputation and such issuers are penalized
by the infliction of higher costs when raising debt in the future. Upon an event
that reveals the weakness of refunding clauses, the discounting hypothesis
suggests that widespread, cross-issuer devaluations of debt with the clauses are
179 See supra note 57 and accompanying text; supra text accompanying notes 108-109, 129-
136.
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likely to result, while the reputation hypothesis would be more consistent with
issuer-specific devaluations, triggered by suspicious actions.
This Note also makes some initial empirical observations that suggest
certain directions for future investigation. Consideration of investors reveals
that sophisticated institutional investors compose a large proportion of bond
buyers, suggesting that the conditions do exist on the investor side of the
market to make enforcement of implicit bargains possible. These observations
also suggest that future research should inquire into the makeup of the
institutional subset of bond buyers, probing whether there are dominant players
and how the actions of one investor might influence others. Such research
would also be usefully supplemented with more formal modeling of the
reputation and retaliation mechanism. Observations of the issuer side of the
market were less supportive; a survey of bond covenants showed a large drop
in the use of refunding clauses after ADM, even though the reputation
hypothesis would suggest that the legal decision should not reduce the clause's
utility so sharply. These preliminary observations also expose, however, a large
change in the use of callable bonds in general, as well as big declines in sinking
fund usage. These changes, along with the background of falling interest rates
during the period studied, strongly suggest that many other factors could have
been at play. The initial survey performed here points the way to more fruitful
empirical studies. Future work should concentrate on bonds issued after ADM
that still used refunding clauses, exploring the characteristics of those issuers;
pricing studies and further exploration of innovations in bond covenants would
also elucidate the issue by helping to control for, and isolate, other
simultaneous changes in the bond market.
The argument presented here suggests that refunding clauses may return if
interest rates were to rise sharply. Although today there exist possible
alternatives, such as make-whole calls, 180 it is not clear that such alternatives
would dominate. The refunding clause can provide issuers with more flexibility
than a make-whole call, which is generally priced to be so punitive that the
literal right to force an investor to surrender a bond at the make-whole price is
180 It is beyond the scope of this Note to analyze whether make-whole calls can substitute for
and serve the same functions as the calls with refunding protection that are the subject of this Note. It
suffices to note initially that "the make-whole call provision, unlike a fixed-price call provision, is not
structured as a refunding vehicle. Rather, the make-whole call provision is structured to enable a firm to
retire debt should circumstances arise, without relying exclusively on a tender offer." Mann & Powers,
supra note 72, at 544. These authors argue "that the appropriate way to characterize a make-whole call
provision is as a cap on the price of a successful tender offer." Id. at 553.
To the extent that legitimate business purposes, of the type that would underlie a non-offending call
of bonds with a refunding clause, could be attained by a capped tender offer, it may be possible to
construe a make-whole call as an alternative to a call with refunding protection. The make-whole call,
however, has the crucial distinction of having a floating call price, which is generally expected to be
higher than market price, see id. at 536, 538. These distinctions would have to be further investigated
before more conclusive comparisons of make-whole calls and calls with refunding protection could be
made. For more on the mechanics and benefits of make-wholes, see id. at 537-38; WILSON & FABOZZI,
supra note 6, at 219 n.10.
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not particularly powerful-if it were, there would not be the level of offering
yields that lead to an issuer attitude of make-whole calls as "costless. '" 81 If
rates rise such that issuers need valuable tools, they should expect to pay for
them, and the refunding clause may yet reemerge as an attractive intermediate
cost option.
More generally, additional research into the power of legal agreements
outside of the legal system may better inform our understandings of the
complex and varied outcomes that markets produce. As Fleischer has urged,
"when academics read and interpret contracts, we should try to account fully
not just for the explicit terms of the contract, but for the informal
understandings and institutional considerations, like reputation, that help
explain behavior. ' 182 Not only must researchers be aware of the non-legal
milieu that surrounds and adds to legal considerations, but also of the ways in
which legal elements can themselves serve as crucial components within extra-
judicial systems. Brooks has developed one example of this phenomenon, with
the argument that residential racial covenants have served as informal guides,
helping to perpetuate racial segregation despite being legally unenforceable. 183
The reputation hypothesis elaborated in this Note continues the work in this
vein, exploring the ways that legal provisions might operate as conventions
between repeat players. The general idea that conventional legal devices might
be intertwined with extra-legal processes so as to function beyond the
traditional notions of law is a powerful one, which if further investigated might
lead to new and unexpected understandings of familiar legal constructs.
181 Mann & Powers, supra note 72, at 552. But see id at 553 (noting the conflict between
empirical findings of make-whole calls being priced and CFOs' opinions).
182 Victor Fleischer, Fickle Investors, Reputation, and the Clientele Effect in Venture Capital
Funds, 40 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 813, 820 (2004). Fleischer's statement arises in an argument for taking
reputation into account as an additional penalty on top of the contractually stipulated penalty found in
venture capital financing agreements. Id. at 813-20.
183 See Richard R. W. Brooks, Covenants & Conventions (Northwestern Law & Econ.
Research Paper Series, Research Paper No. 02-8, 2002) (discussing the value placed on residential racial
covenants in Chicago, despite being legally unenforceable, as a result of violent enforcement, the
covenants' facilitation of coordination, and the role of covenants as a commitment mechanism in a
prisoner's dilemma setting), available at http://ssm.com/abstract-353723.
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Appendix
Examples of Bonds Issued After ADM, with Refunding Clauses
Issue Due
Notes
'Volume and page references to MOODY'S 1992, supra note 35, for each bond description.
b Guaranteed by Capital Cities/ABC Inc.
' A Black & Decker Corp. subsidiary.
d Issuing entity is Time Inc.
' Issuing entity is Viacom International, Inc.

















Time Warner, Inc. d
Unisys Corp.
Viacom, Inc.
Description
Debenture
Debenture
Debenture
Debenture
Debenture
Debenture
Debenture
Debenture
Debenture
Debenture
Debenture
Debenture
Senior
Debenture
Senior
Subordinated
Coupon
8.625%
10.000%
9.875%
8.750%
10.125%
8.500%
9.250%
9.125%
9.500%
9.375%
10.450%
8.750%
9.750%
11.800%
Date
12/1/86
7/5/88
6/1/86
2/11/86
6/1/87
8/15/86
8/15/86
11/18/86
6/4/86
7/1/86
1/15/88
3/27/87
8/26/86
7/28/88
Date
12/1/16
7/1/18
6/1/16
3/15/16
6/1/17
1/15/17
8/25/16
11/15/16
6/1/16
7/1/16
1/15/18
4/1/17
9/15/16
7/15/98
Citation a
Vol. 1,
931
Vol. 1,
932
Vol. 1,
1034
Vol. 1,
2713-14
Vol. 1,
1045-46
Vol. 1,
212-13
Vol. 1,
995
Vol. 1,
1222
Vol. 2,
6160
Vol. 2,
6160
Vol. 2,
6160
Vol. 2,
6381
Vol. 2,
6434
Vol. 2,
6481
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